November 5, 2021: Saudi Arabia and Iran – Sectarianism in the Middle East
Background
Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932 and built its legitimacy on religion, being the custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina and the ruler of the Muslim world. The Imperial State of Iran was formed in 1925 and ruled by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an autocratic ruler who received ample support from the United States. The Nixon administration sought to rely primarily on cooperation with regional states to protect fundamental US interests worldwide.[1] In the Gulf, it decided to rely on Iran and Saudi Arabia, the ‘twin pillars of the Middle East, as both countries received substantial military supply from the US. Saudi Arabia and Iran witnessed relatively stable yet icy relations due to Iran’s recognition and stance over Israel as well as the natural regional competition between one another.
The Iranian revolution
In 1979, the Iranian revolution occurred, which led to the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran by Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini claimed that this was a revolution for the Islamic world and that he was the leader of the Islamic world.[2] He called for the overthrow of the illegitimate monarchies, especially encouraging the Saudis.[3] This was a direct threat to young Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy as it based it on being the leader of the Muslim world, and Khomeini’s statements were directly attacking it. This was the very beginning of the ideological animosity between the two countries.
Additionally, under the new Islamic Republic of Iran, it follows Velayat-e-faqih (guardianship of the jurist). It is a system of governance that transfers all political and religious authority to the Shia clergy.[4] The Supreme Leader makes all the State’s (and the Islamic world’s) vital decisions as he is the only one able to prove guardianship over the nation until the return of the 12th Imam.[5] This essentially bounds the loyalty of the region’s Shiites to Tehran rather than their home countries, which is a direct threat to Saudi Arabia as it has a sizeable Shiite population.
Competition
Both countries were competing for regional influence on how the region and the Muslim world should be ruled based on their versions of Islam. This was a fight for power through the lenses of religion. In order to curtail Iranian influence, Saudi Arabia funded Madrasas and exported Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world, engaged in proxy wars against Iran, and leveraged its special relationship with the US. As for Iran, to curtail Saudi’s influence, it exported its revolution worldwide and created and garnered proxies throughout the region to achieve its regional goals.
Saudi curtailment of Iranian influence
Funding Madrasas and exporting Wahhabism
In response to the direct threat the new Islamic Iranian revolution posed on the Saudi regime and its claim of being the leader of the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia began to export its version of Islam, Wahhabism. It is an ultra-conservative, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam that supports a literalist interpretation and implementation of Sharia and rejects all other sects and forms of Islam.[6] This was the perfect ideology to combat the Shiite ideology as it would naturally completely reject it. Saudi Arabia spent approximately $100 billion over the past couple of decades to spread Wahhabism throughout the world through funding madrasas, mosques, imams, imam learning centers, and cultural learning.[7] Additionally, Wahhabism spread within Saudi Arabia as well, as the Wahhabi clergy gained significant powers and began Islamizing the society, focusing on anti-Shiite rhetoric and sectarian sentiment in all aspects of society.
Engaging in Proxy Wars
In order to avoid direct confrontation with Iran, Saudi Arabia backed proxies to combat Iran’s hegemonic pursuit in countries such as Lebanon and Syria. The very first instance of this is during the Iran-Iraq war. After the Iranian revolution, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein launched a war against Iran to get rid of the new Islamic republic hoping it was unstable and exhausted post-revolution and Saudi Arabia sponsored Iraq through economic and military aid.[8] The war was significant in cementing the new Iranian regime because it reinforced its narrative. Iraq committed mass atrocities, used chemical weapons, and committed many war crimes;[9] however, the US continued supporting Iraq, and the UN repeatedly refused to name Iraq responsible for violating international law. The war was a traumatic experience as over a million people died, and everyone was affected by the war. This reinforced Iran’s anti-imperialist and anti-west ideology as the war showed it alone.
In 2014, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels launched a coup 2014 to overthrow the Saudi-backed Yemeni government of Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi and took over Sanaa, Yemen’s capital. Saudi Arabia feared having an Iranian proxy close to its Southern border as this was a major national and security threat. The Houthis were the perfect opportunity for Iran to inflict a high cost on Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it launched a counterinsurgency coalition campaign to restore the Yemeni government and defeat the Houthis that is ongoing to this day. Iran has repeatedly used the Houthis to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia and target its infrastructure, oil facilities, and American interests. one of many attacks the Houthis launched was an attack on Saudi’s Abha airport in 2019 that killed one civilian and wounded 21 others.[10]
Leveraging its special relationship with the US
The US has armed and continued to arm Saudi Arabia with American weaponry and defense systems with far more technologically superior equipment than anything the Iranian army or the IRGC has. After the JCPOA, Obama sold $90billion worth of arms to the Gulf, with the bulk going to Saudi, an extension of Trump’s $110billion deal to Saudi Arabia in 2017.[11] The US has military bases in Saudi Arabia used as a counterforce to Iran and deterrence to Iranian aggression. The US has continuously deployed aircraft carriers in the Strait of Hormuz to deter malign Iranian activities. For example, the USS Nimitz was deployed in the strait in 2020 after Iran engaged in a spoiling campaign targeting oil tankers.[12]
Iranian curtailment of Saudi influence
Exporting its evolution around the world
Iran’s strategy was to export its revolution by working with Shiites such as Hezbollah, disenfranchised Sunnis such as Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and nonaligned countries such as Syria as an ‘axis of resistance against the West.’ One significant instance of Iran attempting to export its revolution directly is the Hajj pilgrim conflict in 1987. Iranian Shite pilgrims began using Hajj to spread the Iranian revolution to the Muslims visiting from all over the world to attend Hajj. Saudi authorities asked Iran not to use Hajj for political purposes; however, the Iranian pilgrims clashed with Saudi police where at least 400 people were killed, including more than 200 Iranians, which led to both countries cutting diplomatic ties till 1991.[13] Throughout the Arab spring, Iran used soft power and propaganda to support Shiite protests all over the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, encouraging Shiites to protest for their rights.
Created and garnered proxies and used them to achieve regional goals
Iran does not have the technological or military capabilities to compete with its rivals. Iran’s conventional military arsenal is primarily made up of equipment that dates back to the 1970s before the fall of the Shah. Therefore, Iran significantly relies on asymmetric warfare through its support of proxies to bridge the military gap and spread its influence all over the Middle East. Iran heavily relies on this strategy as it has proxies throughout the Middle East. In Lebanon, it supports Hezbollah; in Palestine, it supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad; in Iraq, it supports the PMF and other militias; in Yemen, it supports the Houthis; in Bahrain, it supports the al-Ashtar Brigade and many others.
In Lebanon, Iran helped form and train Hezbollah to counter the Israeli invasion and occupation of 1982. Hezbollah has been a critical ally of Iran and its closest and most reliable proxy as Iran pays Hezbollah $700 million a year.[14] Hezbollah has continuously undermined the Gulf-backed Lebanese State (until recently), essentially creating a state within a state. It also conducts large drug smuggling operations to Saudi and other Gulf states.[15]
Mohammad Bin Salman
Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, was a disruptor to the Saudi-Iranian competition as he shifted the ideological basis of the battle from a religious/sectarian-based (Sunni vs. Shiite) to a nationalistic one (Saudi vs. Iran) and (Arabs vs. Persians). When he first rose to power, MBS focused on centralizing and monopolizing power in Saudi Arabia, traditionally shared between the royals, creating instability and discourse within the royal family.[16] MBS viewed Iran as the best tool to justify the centralization of power, emphasizing the risk Iran poses over the region and that he is the only one that can solve this problem. Additionally, MBS wanted to reform society and shift away from a religious Wahhabi ideology. Therefore, nationalism was seen as the natural successor, and that nationalism can be emphasized and accelerated with an Iranian threat.[17] There are many other benefits to why MBS would target Iran, such as curtailing Iran’s hegemonic pursuit, maintaining Saudi economic supremacy in the region, and maintaining the US-Saudi relationship (which faced many challenges when the US signed the JCPOA with Iran.)
The shift in ideology explains the period of escalation between the Gulf countries, the US, and Iran from 2017 to 2020. With the election of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate reformist, many assumed that it would be a period of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran; however, due to Saudi Arabia’s ideological shift, it compelled it to escalate tensions with Iran to move away from a religious to a more nationalistic ideology domestically. The shift in ideology was even seen in Saudi’s foreign policy during Iraq’s Moqtada al-Sadr’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Moqtada al-Sadr is an influential Shiite cleric from Iraq who heads one of the biggest political parties in Iraq. After the meeting, al-Sadr announced that he would be taking a more non-sectarian stance, battling for Iraqi nationalism.[18] He also announced that the Saudi consulate in the Shiite holy city of Najaf would be reopened, and he ordered all his followers to tear down anti-Saudi posters.[19]
Where we are today
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have engaged in talks with Iran to discuss regional issues and potential rapprochement. Saudi Arabia had depended on the US to deal with Iran; however, the Biden administration has signaled apparent abandonment of the region, pulling out the patriot missiles defense systems to be redeployed in the east.[20] Additionally, many other military installations are being redeployed, and Biden had made it clear that his foreign policy is focused on countering Russia and China. Therefore, the regional powers in the Middle East recognized the need for dialogue with American abandonment, dealing with their problems head-on rather than relying on the US. The competition between the countries will be never-ending; however, the future looks hopeful as opening lines of dialogue can only decrease tension and offer a period of calm and de-escalation.
[1]Lesch, David W., and Mark L. Haas. The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies. Routledge, 2018.
[2] Fisher, Max. “How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East.” The New York Times, 10 Nov. 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html
[3] Ibid.
[4] Aarabi, Kasra. “What Is Velayat-e Faqih?” Tony Blair Institute For Global Change, 20 Mar. 2019, https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih
[5] Aarabi, Kasra. “What Is Velayat-e Faqih?” Tony Blair Institute For Global Change, 20 Mar. 2019, https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih
[6] Long, David E. “Tawhid or Jihad: What Wahhabism is and is not.” The Middle East Institute, 1 Oct. 2009, https://www.mei.edu/publications/tawhid-or-jihad-what-wahhabism-and-not
[7] Pandith, Farah. “Extremism is Riyadh’s top export.” Foreign Policy, 24 Mar. 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/24/farah-pandith-saudi-how-we-win-book/
[8] Fisher, Max. “How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East.” The New York Times, 10 Nov. 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html
[9] Russel, Richard L. “Iraq’s chemical weapons legacy: what other might learn from Saddam.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 59 (2), Spring 2005, pp.187-208.
[10] Al Jazeera Staff. “Yemen’s Houthis attacks Saudi’s Abha airport, injuring civilians.” Al Jazeera, 2 Jul. 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/2/yemens-houthis-attack-saudis-abha-airport-injuring-civilians
Riedel, Bruce. “The $110 billion arms deal to Saudi Arabia is fake news.” Brookings, 5 June. 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-110-billion-arms-deal-to-saudi-arabia-is-fake- news/
[12] AP News Staff. “US carrier transit Strait of Hormuz amid tensions with Iran.” AP News, 18 Sep. 2020, https://bit.ly/3lNNG6Q
[13] Iran Primer Staff. “Timeline of Iran-Saudi Relations.” The Iranian Primer, 29 May. 2018, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/jan/06/timeline-iran-saudi-relations
[14] Karam, Joyce. “Iran pays Hezbollah $700 million a year, US official says.” The National, 6 June. 2018, https://bit.ly/3oA6pVe
[15] Arab News Staff. “Saudi-bound Hezbollah narcotics haul seized in major drugs bust.” Arab News, 9 Sept. 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1925466/saudi-arabia
[16] Diwan, Kristin S. “Saudi Arabia Reassigns Roles within a More Centralized Monarchy.” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 22 Jan. 2019, https://bit.ly/3dHqdQ1
[17] Alhussein, Eman. “Saudi First: How hyper-nationalism is transforming Saudi Arabia.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June. 2019, https://bit.ly/3rQC4Uv
[18] Nejad, Ali F. “The Iranian-Saudi Hegemonic Rivalry.” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, 25 Oct. 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/iranian-saudi-hegemonic-rivalry
[19] Ibid.
[20] Associated Press. “U.S. pulls missile defenses in Saudi Arabia amid Yemen attacks.” Politico, 11 Sept. 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/11/missile-defense-saudi-arabia-511320
