January 7, 2022: Religion and the Use of Force in World Politics by Witt Caldwell
Does religion play a role in whether a third party intervenes in another state’s civil war? Conventional wisdom suggests that it does. When fighting broke out between Maronite Christian and Druze communities in the Levant during the early 1860s, France intervened on the side of the Christians, sending thousands of troops to put a stop to the fighting. Forty years earlier, Russia sent troops to fight in Greece’s war for independence against the Ottoman Empire. Viewing itself as an ardent defender of Orthodox Christians living under Ottoman rule, Russia sought to prevent further atrocities committed against Christians during the war, which included selling Greek women into slavery and hanging clergy. Appalled by the atrocities and compelled to stick up for their fellow Christians oppressed by Muslim ‘infidels,’ Britain and France also sent troops to wrest Greek independence from the Ottomans. Each of these cases show third parties basing their decision to intervene on religious grounds.
Then again, were these interventions motivated by factors other than religion? Russia could have intervened in Greece to gain influence in the Ottoman Empire’s backyard. France may not have been interested in protecting Maronite Christian communities in Syria, but rather expanding its influence in the Middle East—after all, Syria eventually became a French colony following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
These cases highlight a puzzle in the conflict literature: why are some third-party interventions motivated by religion, but not others? This puzzle also raises the question of whether religion even plays a role in third-party interventions. Indeed, religion may serve as a guise for state interests when they intervene in another state’s civil war. However, the argument that religion has a hand in third-party interventions is compelling.
For example, consider Syria’s intervention during the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). When Lebanon was founded in 1943, its leaders agreed to ratify the National Pact, which set up a confessional system where the state’s myriad religious communities were represented in Lebanon’s government. Over time, the Pact was not able to keep up with demographic changes. In the years leading up to the conflict, there were many more Muslims living in Lebanon than Christians, yet Christians had far more influence in the Lebanese government. With the Lebanese government struggling to maintain control, the conflict began in 1975 between various religious factions. The war had several phases, marked by numerous mediation attempts and third-party interventions, and claiming approximately 170,000 lives.
Syria intervened in the early stages of the conflict. At face value, Syria’s decision to intervene seems to stem from power politics, not religion. The civil war added to a long list of events that made for a tumultuous period in the Arab world. Israel’s founding after World War II still stirred controversy and acrimony across the Middle East. A coalition of Arab states, including Syria, spearheaded an unsuccessful war effort against Israel. With the Cold War in full swing, Washington and Moscow’s influence hung over the region.
Before its intervention, there were early indications that Syria would intervene on the side of the Muslim Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), the military wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Damascus deployed Syrian-aligned militias to Lebanon, serving as a stronger indication of a Syrian intervention. The PLA’s forces, along with the forces of other Muslim factions, dwarfed the Christian factions. If the PLA and other Muslim groups decided to stage an attack on the Christians, the Muslim forces would overrun the Christians, delivering a victory to the PLO in Lebanon.
However, as the conflict unraveled, Damascus realized that a PLO victory may not benefit Syria’s interests. For Syria, a PLO victory could welcome an Israeli intervention. Still reeling after its loss of the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War, Damascus wanted to keep Israel out of the conflict. Making matters worse, the Golan Heights are roughly twenty miles away from Syria’s capital, Damascus. An Israeli intervention would have dealt a heavy blow—both politically and strategically—to the Syrians. That said, if Syria helped the PLO, then Israel would be inclined to intervene. On the other hand, if the Christians won, then a Christian-led Lebanon would likely form an alliance with Israel, diminishing Syria’s influence in Lebanon. Damascus was also concerned that Egypt was outmaneuvering Syria to become the principal Arab power in the Middle East, especially given Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s successful peace efforts with Israel. After losing the Golan Heights and Egypt’s success negotiating with Israel, Damascus felt isolated. These factors culminated in a Syrian intervention on the side of Christian forces 1976.
There is a strong case that Syria’s reasoning to intervene on the side of the Christians boiled down to power politics, but religious factors seemed to inform, in part, Damascus’s decision to intervene. That said, why would a Muslim state take the side of Christians fighting against Muslims? This was largely the result of Syria’s ambition to be a predominant power in the Arab world. While Syria wanted to protect its security interests by preventing an Israeli invasion in southern Lebanon, it wanted to maintain its influence over Lebanon—both to satisfy its security interests as well as limit rival Egypt’s political sway. A PLO victory would have achieved neither. A victory would have resulted in an Israeli intervention, while a loss would have ushered in a Christian-led Israeli-Lebanese alliance. Considering this, an intervention securing Syrian influence over Lebanon makes sense. It also shows how religion, in part, underpins Syria’s reasoning.
Syria’s intentions rather than its actions show how religion played a role during its intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. Syria’s decision to intervene was informed by religious underpinnings. In the case of a Christian victory, Syria’s assumption that a Christian-led Lebanon would ally with Israel is, in part, grounded in religious assumptions. The same applies to Syria’s assumption that an intervention on the side of the PLO would trigger an Israeli intervention.
While the argument that religion caused Syria’s intervention early in the Lebanese Civil War would be fallacious, it would not be invalid to argue that it contributed to Syria’s decision to intervene. So, does religion play a role in a state’s decision to intervene in another state’s civil war? It does in part. There are several limits to the argument that third-party interventions are due to religious motives. Chief among them is that religious motives guise for state interests. This is a valid argument. However, the same could be said for state interests—they could guise for underlying religious motives. Ultimately, it depends on the specific states and cultures being examined. Going forward, scholars and analysts should pay more attention to the role religion has in civil wars, especially third-party interventions. Scenarios where Putin’s Russia intervenes in a conflict to defend Russian Orthodox Christians, or even Erdogan’s Turkey intervenes in a conflict to defend Sunni Muslims, is not far-fetched. Understanding the religious motives that underpin a state’s strategic and political interests represents an area for further research that could provide insight into the role that religion plays in civil wars.
For more on the relationship between religion and civil war, see Monica Duffy Toft, “Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31, no. 4 (2007), pp. 97-131.
References
Martha Finnemore, “Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Cornell University Press: 2003), pp. 60-62.
Faten Ghosn and Amal Koury, “Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or Illusion of Peace,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 3 (2011), pp. 1-2; Joseph Bahout, “Lebanese ‘Political Sectarianism’ in Context and Some Regional Lessons,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, September 7, 2018, pp. 1-2.
Hilde Henriksen Waage and Geir Bergersen Huse, “A Careful Minuet: The United States, Israel, Syria, and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1976,” The International History Review 42, no. 5 (2020), pp. 1087-1088.
John Nagle and Mary-Alice Clancy, “Power-sharing after Civil War: Thirty Years since Lebanon’s Taif Agreement,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 25, no. 1 (2019), pp. 3; Ghosn and Koury, “Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or Illusion of Peace,” pp. 383.
