Background
Hezbollah is a Shiite political and military organization rooted in Lebanon. The group was established during the early 1980s with support from Iran. Since then, it has expanded globally and engages in political, criminal, and terrorist operations across six continents, including South America. Its presence in South America began in the mid-1980s when a significant influx of immigrants from Lebanon and Syria arrived.[1] In the past, the group carried out significant attacks against U.S. personnel and interests during the 1980s and 1990s, such as the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The U.S. designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 1997.[2]
Hezbollah established its first major strongholds in Venezuela, Colombia, and the Tri-Border Area. The area is known for its relatively weak law enforcement, where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet. It has increased its activities over time through its grassroots support from diaspora communities. They are diverse, including Arabs, Christians, and Shia.[3] Their support appears pivotal for the armed group. They provide Hezbollah legitimacy, resources and networks, establishing a significant presence in South America.[4]
Hezbollah replicates its social welfare model in Lebanon to overseas diaspora. It aims to ensure influence and control across generations on the continent. Some supporters send remittances to Hezbollah, while many are involved in its illicit activities, acting as facilitators, financiers, or fixers.[5] Hezbollah’s strength mostly lies in the second group. They are an informal and clan-based network of extended families in South American countries.[6] They help the group’s illicit network become hardly detectable. Today, Hezbollah continues to be involved in drug and human trafficking, arms trading, smuggling of illicit cigarettes, trade-based money laundering, and financing terrorism through these clans.[7]
Countering Hezbollah to Promote Security and Stability in South America
The Rada, Saleh, and Nassereddine clans are Hezbollah’s main actors in Venezuela and Colombia. The families share blood ties and seamlessly integrate into the region’s economic life. They exploit corruption and lax law enforcement in the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay and the Colon Free Trade Zone in Panama. They finance terrorism through drug and human trafficking, arms trading, illicit cigarette smuggling, and money laundering. They generate an estimated $300 million per year and funnel the money to Lebanese Hezbollah.[8]
The U.S. approaches Hezbollah activities in South America as a transnational criminal organization, unlike its approach in the Middle East where Hezbollah is a designated terrorist entity. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions the families, specifically the Rada brothers, under E.O. 13224 in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration.[9] Blocking access to the U.S. market appears to have limited impact on the organization’s network. The Rada brothers remain active in trade and finance. They are still able to travel freely, and they utilize the regime-controlled illicit economy in Venezuela to access financial resources.
To combat Hezbollah, the U.S. needs more than sanctions. The U.S. should emphasize diplomatic efforts, foster greater hemispheric cooperation, and build capacity to stop Hezbollah on all fronts.
Diplomatic efforts are important in persuading South American countries to recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Hezbollah is not classified as a terrorist organization in most South American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Peru. Local authorities are limited in their ability to monitor and prosecute the group and its operatives. Diplomatic initiatives can raise awareness among South American governments about the risks posed by Hezbollah’s presence. Awareness can enable local authorities to legally monitor, prosecute, and take action against Hezbollah’s operations.
Greater hemispheric cooperation will enhance anti-Hezbollah efforts. Diplomatic, defense, and law enforcement cooperation will lead to more effective action. Countries should pool resources, share intelligence, and synchronize activities. One country might have advanced surveillance technology, while another has specialized knowledge in counterterrorism tactics. Sharing these resources means that all countries can benefit without bearing the full cost alone. For instance, the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay formed the 3+1 Group for Tri-Border Security after the September 11 attacks. Their Tripartite Command integrates police intelligence agents from Ciudad del Este, Foz de Yguazú in Brazil, and Puerto Yguazú in Argentina. The cooperation has led to an increase in Hezbollah-related arrests for drug trafficking and money laundering.[10]
Offering resources for capacity building will improve the counterterrorism and organized crime capabilities of South American governments. This effort should include strengthening security forces, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement. Over time, these resources can make these countries less reliant on external assistance.
There are concerns that a united front against Hezbollah can push the Venezuelan government to further deepen its relationships with Hezbollah leaders, Iran, and Russia. Yet building a regional coalition that includes a diverse group of countries can help mitigate Venezuela’s reliance on adversarial partnerships. By fostering a sense of mutual benefit, cooperation can encourage Venezuela to prioritize regional stability over contentious alliances. This strategy addresses the immediate threat posed by Hezbollah and contributes to a foundation for long-term stability and prosperity in South America.
Hezbollah’s influence extends into political, financial, and military spheres in South America. U.S. sanctions alone will not address its threat. Diplomatic efforts, greater hemispheric cooperation, and capacity-building in the region offer the best way to stop Hezbollah. Such cooperation will neutralize the immediate threats posed by Hezbollah and lay the groundwork for a better future. South America will realize its full potential, free from the shadows of terrorism and crime. Such a world is not only better for South America but for the global community. It marks a significant step forward in our collective quest for a safer, more just world.
[1] Hezbollah’s Record on War & Politics,” October 25, 2023, Wilson Center, p. 4-5
[2] Robinson, Kali. “What Is Hezbollah?” Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified October 14, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah.
[3] Realuyo, Celina. Interview by Seda GUNES. “Discussion on Hezbollah.” February 6, 2024.
[4] “HEZBOLLAH IN LATIN AMERICA–IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
[5] Realuyo, Celina. Interview by Seda GUNES.
[6] Joseph M. Humire, “The Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime,” October 7, 2020, Atlantic Council. p. 3-4
[7] Ibid.
[8] Emanuele Ottolenghi. “U.S. Treasury Sanctions Latin America-Based Hezbollah Financial Network,” September 13, 2023, Flash Brief, Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
[9] Treasury Designates Hizballah Operatives and Financial Facilitators in South America and Lebanon,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 12, 2023.
[10] Realuyo, Celina B. “Rising Concerns about Hezbollah in Latin America Amid Middle East Conflict.” Blog post. December 1, 2023.
