Category: Student Events

Executive Summary:
The Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syra (ISIS) or Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), is a transnational Sunni Islamist terrorist and insurgency organization. While
the group has seen a decline over the past five years, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)has
assessed that the organization has the capability to sustain itself and its operations at its present level in
the Syrian desert. 1 The Islamic State can sustain itself even after successive blows to its organization in
large part due to its intelligence apparatus and counterintelligence efforts. The Emni, the Islamic State’s
intelligence service, has been extremely effective in carrying out the organization’s intelligence and
counterintelligence efforts. To form effective counterterrorism policy and strategy against the Islamic
State, it is essential to understand the group’s intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities.

The Islamic State and the Emni Background:
Originally an affiliate of the terrorist organization Al Qaeda, the Islamic State grew out of the
organization formally known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). 2 However,
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was formally founded in 2013 when its leader, Abu Bakr Al-
Baghdadi, proclaimed himself as the caliph. In 2014, Al Qaeda officially severed ties with al-Baghdadi’s
Islamic State when it subsumed the Al Qaeda affiliate organization in Syria, the Nusra Front. 3 While the
Islamic State has suffered significant blows over the last several years, it continues to wage low-level
insurgency across central and northern Syria and across parts of the Syrian Desert that cross into Iraq. 4
The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) has stated that the Islamic State, at its present level,
has the capability to sustain operations in the Syrian Desert. Despite its decline and territorial losses, the
Islamic State can sustain itself and evade total defeat in large part due to its sophisticated intelligence
and counterintelligence efforts.

The Islamic State intelligence and counterintelligence service is known as the Emni. Emni in
Arabic stands for “security,” “Trust,” or “Safety” and is responsible for the collection of intelligence both
within and outside of the Islamic State. 5 The Emni’s structure and operations are highly influenced by
the former Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime’s intelligence service. Haji Bakr, a former colonel in
Hussein’s intelligence service, has been called al Baghdadi’s spymaster and architect of the Emni. 6 Along
with Bakr, other former intelligence and military officers of the Hussein regime have filled the ranks of
the Islamic State Emni. Pulling on the knowledge and experience of Hussein’s intelligence service, the
Emni has become a sophisticated organization.

Intelligence and Counterintelligence:
All organizations, whether state or non-state, owe their security and continued operations and
activities to counterintelligence. Counterintelligence has repeatedly lacked attention in much of the
counterterrorism literature, even though it plays a vital support role in any organization’s intelligence
function. To understand a terrorist organization like the Islamic State and its intelligence and
counterintelligence apparatus, it is important to understand the meaning of both terms.

Intelligence refers to information collected, processed, and disseminated to decision-makers
who guide policy based on the learned information. However, what makes intelligence more unique
than simple research and data collection is the element of secrecy. While maintaining a certain level of secrecy is important for all organizations, it is especially important for illicit organizations that seek to
evade detection and avoid disruption, like the Islamic State. Therefore, it is the role of
counterintelligence to guard an organization’s secrets. Counterintelligence can be understood as
activities and processes organizations conduct to detect and deter insider threats and moles, as well as
those activities that seek to deceive and neutralize an adversary’s intelligence collection operations. 7
Simply put, counterintelligence aims to prevent an adversary from gaining inside access to one’s secrets,
which can be done using various counterintelligence methods.

A framework for understating counterintelligence, as advanced by Dr. Henry Prunckun,
identifies two main taxonomic classifications of counterintelligence: defensive and offensive
counterintelligence. 8 Defensive counterintelligence focuses on detection and deterrence, while offensive
focuses on deception and neutralization. Defensive counterintelligence, detection, and deterrence
activities typically fall within the categories of basic denial and adaptive denial. At the same time,
offensive counterintelligence deception and neutralization activities fall under the category of covert
manipulation. Basic denial, adaptive denial, and covert manipulation are theoretical categories that
build off of and overlap with one another, where activities of one category can bleed over into another.

Basic denial is a foundational counterintelligence process that aims to prevent the movement of
information, either intentionally or unintentionally, from one’s organization to an adversarial one. Basic
denial typically takes the form of vetting procedures for new personnel and carrying out measures to
ensure that current personnel have not been compromised. Activities of basic denial include background
checks, polygraph interviews, having a formal or informal system for reporting abnormal and alerting
behavior, and educating members about the risks and penalties for espionage. 9

Adaptive denial builds off of basic denial by examining the unique intelligence collection
operations of an adversary and altering its security measures to counter these collection efforts.
Adaptive denial activities include the investigation and interrogation of suspected insider threats, the
cataloging of personally identifiable information of members, the identification of risk factors for
potential traitors, tracking group members’ access to sensitive information, and conducting damage
assessments when information is leaked. 10 However, more sophisticated adaptive denial techniques,
which in some cases begin to cross over and are associated with activities of covert manipulation,
include the penetration of the adversary’s intelligence organization and communications systems and
the identification of human sources that could pinpoint traitors within one’s organization. 11

Covert manipulation falls under the taxonomic classification of offensive counterintelligence and
is the most sophisticated subprocess of counterintelligence. Covert manipulation aims to deceive and
neutralize an adversary’s intelligence collection methods, which requires significant insight into an
adversary’s intelligence apparatus. 12 Covert manipulation includes activities and processes that attempt
to plant false information about an organization and its operations to mislead and distract an adversary.
While not as effective as state intelligence services at conducting activities of covert manipulation,
terrorist and insurgent organizations are increasingly growing in sophistication and attempting to carry
out deceptive aspects of covert manipulation.

The Emni and its Intelligence and Counterintelligence Efforts:
The Islamic State’s Emni is responsible for the collection of intelligence both within and outside
of the Islamic State. 13 The Islamic State, like many other terrorist and insurgent organizations, requires
some level of secrecy to maintain its operational security and defend itself from adversaries that seek to
dismantle the organization. As previously stated, counterintelligence aims to prevent an adversary from
gaining inside access to one’s secrets. Therefore, the Emni employs both defensive and offensive
counterintelligence, specifically the activities of basic denial, adaptive denial, and covert manipulation to
maintain the organization’s security.

Basic Denial
The primary basis of the Emni’s basic denial activities is the utilization of its extensive informant
network and its system of vetting members. The Islamic State’s informant network operates as a formal
and informal system for reporting altering or suspicious behavior and is critical in the detection and
deterrence of insider threats. The Emni uses Da’wah offices or religious centers in areas under its control
as central locations where informants can meet to report on suspicious individuals and is used as a
prime location where the Emni recruits potential ISIS members. 14 Both paid and unpaid informants
report any alerting behavior and conversations to Emni members at local Da’wah offices. 15 The
Informant system as a method of counterintelligence allows the Emni to collect intelligence within the
Islamic state about its citizen. Haji Bakr, often referred to as the architect of the Emni, designed the ISIS
informant network in an attempt to create almost an omnipresence of the Emni throughout ISIS-
controlled territory. Under this informant system, everyone, even children as young as 6 and 7, became
informants for the Emni. 16 As stated by one former Emni member, “The people will be good eyes and
armor to protect us from spies…”. 17 Another significant aspect of the ISIS informant system was its use of paid informants. In certain cases, paid informants could earn up to $5,000 for each spy caught. 18
However, while this appears to enhance the informant system through monetary incentives, one must
question the reliability of informants when a great deal of money is offered. The creation of the
informant system is one of the most critical components of the Islamic State’s ability to monitor
members and asses if an adversary has compromised any current members and is therefore critical to its
basic denial efforts.

Furthermore, the Islamic State’s system of vetting new members is also a critical basic denial
activity. The Islamic State’s vetting system aims to prevent, detect, and deter the entry of any potential
insider threats. The ISIS vetting system includes the use of fingerprinting, collection of blood samples,
physical examinations, and requires the periodic confiscation of new and current members’ electronic
devices. 19 Electronic devices such as phones and personal laptops are periodically seized and
investigated for signs of disloyalty or treason. For most new members of ISIS, there is a significant
amount of distrust and skepticism, but even more so for foreign fighters. An additional step of the
vetting process for foreign fighters that the Emni distrusts includes sending these individuals to battle,
where they will either prove themselves or die. 20 Additionally, in some cases, those that the Emni
distrusts are encouraged to be martyrs and suicide bombers. In any case, those who are untrustworthy
are provided with limited information until they prove their loyalty or are otherwise physically
eliminated.

Adaptive Denial: Adaptive denial aims to identify an adversary’s unique intelligence collection methods and
establish measures to counter such collection efforts. The Islamic State’s most prominent adaptive
denial method is its use of extreme violence to create fear. Leaders of the Islamic State recognize that
the organization faces many adversaries and, therefore, uses violence and fear not only to communicate
its political objectives as a terrorist organization but also to use these elements as a primary means of
deterring insider threats. The use of extreme violence, such as beheadings and other public executions,
can be an effective tool at deterring adversarial intelligence collection efforts, preventing defectors, and
maintaining order within the Islamic State. 21 Additionally, the extensive and pervasive informant system
is another means of establishing fear of the Emni and its reach. The fear that an informant will out
anyone who is suspected of being a spy is a significant deterring factor. Often, those traitors and spies
found within the Islamic State are interrogated, tortured, and have their confessions filmed and
broadcast. 22 The use of filming and broadcasting confusions, whether real or false, also works to create
even more fear throughout its territory and the world that the Emni will find all traitors and spies within
its territory and eliminate them.

Another aspect of the Islamic State’s adaptive denial activities is the Emni’s efforts to recruit
human sources in areas that the Islamic State seeks to influence and control. The recruitment of human
sources is a sophisticated adaptive denial activity that helps identify insider threats within the Islamic
State and the identification of potential threats in territories and communities ISIS seeks to control. 23
When the Islamic State seeks to gain control of a new town or community, it will often open a Da’wah
office that bases Emni officers and members. As previously mentioned, Da’wah offices or religious
centers are used as prime locations for the recruitment of new ISIS members. Human sources within a
new community or area that ISIS is seeking to control are identified by Emni officers at these newly
opened Da’wah offices and are recruited to provide the Emni with key information about local leaders
and influential members of the community. Using these human sources, the Emni can determine if there
are any alerting or suspicious individuals in the area that may have been planted by another intelligence
service as well as those that may be sympathetic to or against ISIS’s efforts, which ultimately assists in
ISIS’s infiltration and eventual takeover of a new community. Some human sources that are recruited
are even instructed to try and marry into an influential family as a means of gaining loyalty. 24 The
recruitment of human sources as a sophisticated activity of adaptive denial begins to push into the
category of covert manipulation as a great deal of deception is involved in using Da’wah offices for more
nefarious purposes and the deceptive practices human sources must sometimes carry out. However, as
a defensive counterintelligence effort, using human sources is critical in detecting insider threats and
potential future threats.

Another adaptive denial technique of the Islamic State focuses on the collection and cataloging
of personally identifiable information of members. The cataloging of personally identifiable information
of members is an important aspect of many bureaucracies to keep track of those living and working
within one’s territory. Information is collected, primarily through the ISIS informant network, on all
individuals living within the Islamic State, and certain profiles of ISIS members are cataloged in physical
and digital databases. 25 All information compiled on members of the Islamic State is maintained and
examined by the Emni to determine if any members show signs of risk factors for potential traitors. If
any member’s profile presents signs that they are potential traitors, the Emni is responsible for tracking
down, arresting, and investigating any of these members. The idea that the Emni must identify, track
down, and investigate any threats to the Islamic State is not only part of its counterintelligence effort but also resonates with ISIS’s greater principle that its land must be purged of any opposition in order to
unify a Salafist community. 26

Covert Manipulation
As previously mentioned, covert manipulation is the most sophisticated subprocess of
counterintelligence, and it aims to deceive and neutralize an adversary’s intelligence collection methods.
Activities of covert manipulation are typically practiced solely by state intelligence services. However,
increasingly advanced terrorist and insurgent organizations are attempting to carry out deceptive
aspects of covert manipulation while still not full achieving neutralization aspects. Deceptive activities
aimed at misdirecting adversarial intelligence collection efforts as carried out by the Islamic State
include the use of Da’wah offices in new towns and areas, the obfuscation of the actual number of ISIS
members, and the attempt to train members on how to pass as westerners when traveling.

As stated in the previous section, Da’wah offices are a critical component of ISIS’s ability to
recruit human sources, especially in areas where it wishes to overtake. Human sources are a critical
aspect of its adaptive denial techniques as they are important in detecting spies within the Islamic State
and potential threats in new communities. However, infiltrating new towns and communities by
recruiting human sources is also part of its deceptive activities of covert manipulation. By infiltrating a
new community or town through these Da’wah offices, these human sources can begin to spread either
false or misleading information about the Islamic State and its intentions. 27 These human sources that
are recruited may vary in occupation and societal class; with a greater focus on recruiting sources with
access to influential roles and members in these new towns and areas, the Islamic State has a greater
degree of garnering community support for the organization.

Another aspect of ISIS’s deceptive practices of covert manipulation is the obfuscation of the
actual number of fighters the organization has. The obfuscation of the member count of ISIS is part of its
efforts to maintain the element of surprise and its operational security. One way the Islamic State seeks
to distort both regional and international adversaries is by using uniforms when they carry out attacks
and when they engage in battle. ISIS fighters are often spotted wearing black masks when they are
fighting. The use of a simple black mask not only conceals the identity of those involved in an attack but
also makes it difficult to count the actual number of fighters ISIS has. 28 By having members appear in
black masks at multiple locations over a certain amount of time, it becomes difficult to identify if these
are the same members carrying out attacks repeatedly or if these are a totally new set of fighters,
obscuring the true number of fighters. The act of obscuring the number of fighters is a deceptive
measure aimed at disrupting an adversary’s assessment of the Islamic State and its personnel.

Another deceptive measure that the Islamic State attempts to carry is the training on how to blend into a society that trusted members are traveling to. To avoid defectors, only greatly trusted members of ISIS and the Emni travel abroad to carry out attacks, track down other known defectors, and carry out other business of the Islamic State. 29 These members who travel abroad, especially if traveling to a Western country, are provided limited training on how they might best fit in when traveling to avoid detection and detainment by foreign customs and law enforcement officials. Part of this training is guided by ISIS publications such as “How to Survive in the West,” which guides members not only on how they should appear while traveling in the West but also on what cosmetics to use and what underwear to wear so as not to draw attention to them when going through airports and customs. 30 While these deceptive measures appear to be minor and by no means attempt to neutralize an adversary’s intelligence collection efforts, they are beginning attempts to carry out deceptive aspects of covert manipulation to mislead and distort the adversary’s view and assumptions of the Islamic State.

Conclusion:
No organization is immune to insider threats and information leakages. Even the most powerful
intelligence services, such as the CIA, are prone to defectors. The Islamic State’s Emni is no different,
and it has attempted to carry out the counterintelligence activities of basic denial, adaptive denial, and
covert manipulation to offset this issue of insider threats. Therefore, it is important to the
counterintelligence vulnerabilities and capabilities of nefarious organizations like the Islamic State. A
better understanding of the methods by which the Islamic State secures itself from potential spies is
critical in forming counter-terrorism strategies and policies to counter organizations like ISIS.

Endnotes
1 Thomas, Clayton. “The Islamic State.” Congressional Research Service, 2022.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10328
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 “Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-Eastern Syria.” International Crisis Group, September 6, 2022.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/containing-resilient-isis-
central-and-north.
5 Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
Apparatus.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 3. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297733.
6 Ferdinand J. Haberl, “Chapter 9: Counterintelligence,” essay, in Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence:
Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023), 179–216, 181.
7 Blake W. Mobley, “Chapter 1: Introduction,” introduction, in Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist
Groups Elude Detection (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012), 8.
8 Hank Prunckun, Counterintelligence Theory and Practice ( Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2019),
26.
9 Blake W. Mobley, “Chapter 1: Introduction,” introduction, in Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist
Groups Elude Detection (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012), 8.
10 Ibid, 9.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, 10.
13 Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
Apparatus.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 3. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297733.
14 Carl Anthony Wege, “The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus,” International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018): 275. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1418552
15 Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
Apparatus.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 7. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297733.
16 Ibid, 7.
17 Ferdinand J. Haberl, “Chapter 9: Counterintelligence,” essay, in Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence:
Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023), 184.
18 Vera Mironova, Ekaterina Sergatskova, and Karam Alhamad, “Isis’ Intelligence Service Refuses to Die,” Foreign
Affairs, January 17, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2017-11-22/isis-intelligence-service-
refuses-die.
19 Ferdinand J. Haberl, “Chapter 9: Counterintelligence,” essay, in Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence:
Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023), 179–216, 207.
20 Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
Apparatus.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 7. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297733.
21 Ibid, 7.
22 Vera Mironova, Ekaterina Sergatskova, and Karam Alhamad, “Isis’ Intelligence Service Refuses to Die,” Foreign
Affairs, January 17, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2017-11-22/isis-intelligence-service-
refuses-die.
23 Ferdinand J. Haberl, “Chapter 9: Counterintelligence,” essay, in Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence:
Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023), 179–216, 183.
24 Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
Apparatus.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 5. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297733.

25 Carl Anthony Wege, “The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus,” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018): 275. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1418552
26 Ferdinand J. Haberl, “Chapter 9: Counterintelligence,” essay, in Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence:
Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023), 186.
27 Carl Anthony Wege, “The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus,” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018): 274. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1418552
28 Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
Apparatus.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 5. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297733.
29 Ferdinand J. Haberl, “Chapter 9: Counterintelligence,” essay, in Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence:
Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023), 186.
30 Ibid.

Bibliography

2022. “Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-Eastern Syria.” International Crisis Group, September 6, 2022. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-
      mena/syria/containing-resilient-isis-central-and-north.
      Haberl, Ferdinand J. “Chapter 9: Counterintelligence.” Essay. In Jihadi Intelligence and
      Counterintelligence: Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods, 179–216. Cham:
      Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023.
      Mironova, Vera, Ekaterina Sergatskova, and Karam Alhamad. “Isis’ Intelligence Service Refuses to Die.”
      Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2017-11-22/isis-
      intelligence-service-refuses-die.
      Mobley, Blake W. “Chapter 1: Introduction.” Introduction. In Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How
      Terrorist Groups Elude Detection, 1–19. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012.
      Prunckun, Hank. Counterintelligence theory and practice. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
      2019.
      Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
      Apparatus.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 2–16.
      http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297733.
      Thomas, Clayton. “The Islamic State.” Congressional Research Service, 2022.
      https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10328
      Wege, Carl Anthony. “The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus.” International Journal of
      Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018): 271–88.
      https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1418552.

April 7, 2023: “Swipe up for Jihad: TikTok’s Starter Guide to Religious Hate Crime” by Talya Ackerman

Executive Summary
The lack of community guideline enforcement has made TikTok a breeding ground for unfettered hate speech. Violent messaging is easily proliferated to users through the app’s algorithm, which suggests related content that appeals to the patron’s perceived interests. Short-form videos separate TikTok from other platforms and increase the likelihood of accidentally stumbling upon a dangerous video. Brutality is spread through hate groups, including Jihadists and Nazis, while individual users engage in antisemitic and Islamophobic tropes.

Jihad Lover
Jihadist groups exploit child friendly TikTok effects to make their violent or inappropriate content more palatable. 2019 videos sourced from the Wall Street Journal demonstrated the Islamic State’s ingenuity in appealing to a less sought after demographic: young girls [1]. Videos of jihadists adorned with hearts and flowers–in accordance with traditional gender norms–were plastered on targeted “for you pages.” TikTok’s all- encompassing algorithm pedaled images of women in burqas carrying the Islamic State Flag, captioned “Jihad Lover” [2]. Some of these videos were spliced with footage of Western men riding horses, appealing to the glorification of Western culture [3]. Indoctrinating young women with jihadist messaging ensures a generation of women that regurgitate these ideals and support their brothers, sons, or husbands should they join the Islamic State.

Videos found in 2021 by the Institute of Strategic Dialogue were less child-proof. These videos entailed drone footage of car bombings, beheadings, and suicide bombers [4]. The author of the ISD report found the content with ease. Since the publishing of ISD’s report, the specific videos were deleted. Restrictions can be circumvented by changing the spelling of banned keywords, such as typing “i$is” instead of “isis.” Simply typing “Hezbollah” in the search bar conjures more videos of beheadings, war footage and recruitment videos. Knowing how to evade the poorly enforced restrictions could allow a young child to find this footage and follow the wrong path provided by the algorithm.

Nazi Ideology
Focus will be placed on individuals and Nazi motifs rather than established groups. Individual accounts enact symbols and popular figures to proliferate antisemitism, while also using editing tactics similar to Jihadists. These tools include overlaying videos with trendy songs, which make the videos easier to find when the song is searched for. Users popularize Esoteric Nazism, which is rooted in the idolization of Hyperborea [5]. This mythological Greek land falsely represents an Aryan fairyland. Esoteric Nazism worships the swastika and the Sonnenrad, an innocuous Sun image that is distorted into a hate symbol. A popular video of Riley Williams, who was convicted for storming the Capitol on January 6th, displays the Sonnenrad hat while she performs the Sieg Heil [6]. To supplement these themes, clips of famous Nazis speeches circulate rapidly from the TikTok algorithm. Viewers can watch thirty second reels of Joseph Goebbel spitting vitriol against Jews in his classic speeches [7]. TikTok acts as a new propaganda machine to quickly brainwash young children who are exposed to Nazi messaging.

Six Million
Antisemitic content can be found within seventy-five minutes of scrolling after creating a new account [8]. Themes of ethnic discrimination, Jewish scapegoats, and holocaust denial are most prevalent. Similar to Jihadist word coding, using veiled language can assist in finding antisemitic videos. Another search term is “jewpilled.” This term is a play on the theme of “taking the red pill,” which signifies learning a difficult truth in a disturbing way. One video tagged with “jewpilled” shows a caricature of a Jewish man hallucinating gas chambers because he is labeled schizophrenic. There is dissonance among the TikTok hive mind regarding the existence of the Holocaust while simultaneously using it as a means to express antisemitism. For example, searching “six million,” yields videos that claim, “one oven can’t cook six million cookies,” in a less overt reference to holocaust denial.

Islamophobia
A significant portion of Islamophobic videos found were revering Ratko Mladic, a Bosnian Serbian general responsible for the mass execution of Bosnian Muslims [9]. One video depicted a soldier in a trench captioned, “Me when my Muslim friend tells me Jesus is a prophet and I’m going to go Ratko Mladic on him.” The search term, “Ratko Mladic,” is not regulated. Some comments outright denied the war atrocities. Different videos claimed that all Muslims were terrorists and were taking over Europe, playing into modern eurocentrism [10].

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Bibliography
[1] Wells, Georgia. “Islamic State Turns to Teen-Friendly TikTok, Adorning Posts With Pink Hearts –
WSJ.” The Wall Street Journal. Accessed April 3, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-
state-turns-to-teen-friendly-tiktok-adorning-posts-with-pink-hearts-
11571680389?mod=article_inline.

[2] Wells, Georgia. “Islamic State Turns to Teen-Friendly TikTok, Adorning Posts With Pink Hearts –
WSJ.” The Wall Street Journal. Accessed April 3, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-
state-turns-to-teen-friendly-tiktok-adorning-posts-with-pink-hearts-
11571680389?mod=article_inline.

[3] Wells, Georgia. “Islamic State Turns to Teen-Friendly TikTok, Adorning Posts With Pink Hearts –
WSJ.” The Wall Street Journal. Accessed April 3, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-
state-turns-to-teen-friendly-tiktok-adorning-posts-with-pink-hearts-
11571680389?mod=article_inline.

[4] O’Connor, Ciarán. “Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok.”
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, August 24, 2021. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/HateScape_v5.pdf

[5] O’Connor, Ciarán. “Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok.”
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, August 24, 2021. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/HateScape_v5.pdf

[6] O’Connor, Ciarán. “Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok.”
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, August 24, 2021. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/HateScape_v5.pdf

[7] O’Connor, Ciarán. “Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok.”
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, August 24, 2021. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/HateScape_v5.pdf

[8] Rawnsley, Adam. “TikTok Served Nazi Propaganda, Jan. 6 Committee Found – Rolling Stone,”
January 5, 2023. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/tiktok-served-nazi-
propaganda-jan-6-committee-found-1234656268/.

[9] O’Connor, Ciarán. “Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok.”
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, August 24, 2021. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/HateScape_v5.pdf

[10] O’Connor, Ciarán. “Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok.”Institute for Strategic Dialogue, August 24, 2021. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/HateScape_v5.pdf

March 8, 2023: “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang” by Noelle Heineman

Who are the Uyghurs:

The Uyghurs are a Muslim minority ethnic group living mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the northwest corner of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[i] The Uyghurs speak their own language, which resembles other Turkish languages and practice moderate Sunni Islam. XUAR is a provincial-level administrative region comprising almost a sixth of China’s total land area and borders eight countries.[ii]

For most of its documented history, the Xinjiang region has been under the political control and influence of the Chinese, Mongols, and Russians, with limited Turkish or Uyghur rule periods. Uyghurs, along with other Muslim minority ethnic groups in southern Xinjiang, have previously mobilized political opposition and established two semi-autonomous East Turkestan Republics throughout the 1930s and 1940s, as many Uyghurs view the region as an extension of East Turkestan.[iii] However, in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power and occupied the Xinjiang region.[iv] Since its occupation, it has increased its control over the region and the Uyghur community through various political and religious repression policies. Repression policies have included the forced removal of women’s face veils, required shaving of men’s beards, and the destruction of mosques as well as providing economic incentives to the country’s Han Chinese, particularly men, to move to Xinjiang and marry Uyghur women as means of forced assimilation.[v]

As repression policies have increased and the CCP doubled down on its forced assimilation efforts, bouts of violence between Uyghurs and Chinese security forces have spiked, especially between 2013 and 2015, as PRC leaders have carried out large-scale criminal arrests in Xinjiang and intensified security measures aimed at combating what the PRC considers “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”[vi] One of the main security measures that the PRC has taken, which has recently garnered international and humanitarian attention, is the establishment of an estimated 380 re-education camps in Xinjiang, where almost 2 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities have been arbitrarily detained and where numerous human rights abuses have been committed.[vii]

Mass Detention of Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang:

Since 2017, an estimated 2 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, including ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks, have been arbitrarily detained in reeducation camps in Xinjiang.[viii] PRC officials have claimed that these “facilities” are vocational education and training centers, and forced detentions have not occurred.[ix] While the information on what exactly happens in these reeducation camps is limited, based on reports and interviews from previously detained individuals, those arrested are subjected to food deprivation, psychological pressure, sexual abuse, medical neglect, torture, forced labor, and forced sterilization.[x] Furthermore, reports have claimed that detainees were obligated to pledge their loyalty to the CCP, learn Mandarin, and abandon their Islamic faith. Additionally, the PRC has reportedly placed nearly a half a million Uyghur and religious minority children into state-run boarding schools and has banned the use of Uyghur and non-Mandarin languages in all schools in Xinjiang.[xi]

The PRC’s re-education efforts have been underway in Xinjiang since 2014, but efforts were drastically expanded in 2017 when President Xi Jinping initiated policies of religious Sinicization.[xii] Sinicization is the process of making something more Chinese or bringing something under Chinese influence. Xi initiated these Sinicization policies as means of revitalizing Chinese nationalism.[xiii] Xi and the CCP have for decades viewed the Uyghurs as well as other religious minorities as corrupting threats to the PRC. Since 2017, there has been substantial evidence from satellite imagery of the construction of new re-education camps and the expansion of current detention centers for the purpose of mass internment. According to satellite imagery, between April 2017 and August 2018, around 39 known re-education camps in Xinjiang tripled in size and covered a total area equivalent to 140 soccer fields.[xiv] The increase of 20 billion yuan in security-related facilities in Xinjiang also indicates the expansion and mass use of re-education camps.[xv] After the discovery of the re-education camps, PRC leadership faced significant pressure from the international community to shut down and release all arbitrarily detained people. After repeated denials of the camp’s existence, in 2019, PRC leadership in Xinjiang announced that all detainees had “graduated” and the centers were closed. However, according to satellite imagery, a suspected 380 facilities are still operational, with many of these facilities receiving new high-security upgrades.[xvi]

Furthermore, while reports indicate that some of the detainees were released after the 2019 announcement of “graduation,” many others were forced into labor in factories, and the rest were prosecuted as criminals or terrorists.[xvii] The formal justice system in Xinjiang has been used as a tool for the government to detain and imprison Uyghurs and other religious minorities whom the government views as extremists or terrorists. Additionally, according to reports, those released were done so under the condition that they renounced their Islamic beliefs and customs. In 2022 UN Human Rights Watch reported that nearly half of a million people had been prosecuted in Xinjiang since 2017.[xviii]

Those detained were generally not accused of any one crime but rather held on based on their past religious, cultural, scholarly, social, and online activities that the government later deemed extremist, pre-criminal, or potentially terroristic. People were also detained if they were found to have communicated with or traveled to any of the twenty-six countries China considers sensitive, such as Turkey and Afghanistan, attended services at mosques, or had more than three children.[xix] None of the detainees in these re-education camps received any legal avenues to challenge their detentions. In many cases, Uyghurs and other religious minorities in China have been detained and labeled as extremists simply for practicing their religion.

What do Chinese Officials say about the Camps:

            As previously stated above, PRC officials have denied the existence of re-education camps and only after significant international pressure recognized these facilities as vocational education and training centers. Members of the CCP have claimed that these re-education centers have two primary purposes.[xx] One is to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, and vocational skills. Two, to prevent citizens from becoming influenced by extremist ideas and to “nip activism in the bud.”[xxi] CCP officials have also claimed that these camps have prevented violence and potential terroristic activities and state that the fact that there have been no terrorist attacks since 2016 is proof.  

As international criticism of China’s human rights abuses has grown, the CCP has increasingly worked to discredit any reports on Xinjiang and the Uyghurs through the dissemination of disinformation, harassment of activists, and repeated denial. In addition, the CCP has claimed that the U.S. and other western nations have promoted “anti-China” narratives.[xxii]

Targeting of Uyghurs in Xinjiang:

The forced detainment and imprisonment of Uyghurs and other religious minorities is part of the CCP and President Xi Jinping’s larger policies and initiatives of Sinicization aimed at forcefully assimilating Uyghurs into PRC society. Xi and the CCP have argued that the policies and initiatives of Sinicization are meant to “actively guide religions to adopt Chinese socialist society.”[xxiii] The CCP has claimed concerns about extremist and separatist ideology among Uyghurs and has justified the internment of these people to secure territorial integrity, the government, and the people. The Uyghurs and other religious minorities, such as Christians and Tibetan Buddhists, have been consistently targeted as the CCP fears the influence, particularly foreign influence, that religions can have and the separatism that can spur.[xxiv] Therefore, the CCP has instituted restrictive religious policies as a means to mitigate the influence of religions and clamp down on minority communities through the labeling of religious practices as prone to terrorism.

As tensions and violence in Xinjiang over religious repression policies have intensified over the past decades, the CCP has blamed many outbreaks of violence and some attacks on Xinjiang security forces on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM is a separatist movement founded by Uyghur militants in the 2000s.[xxv] Following the events of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the CCP began justifying intensified actions taken towards Uyghurs in Xinjiang as taking part in the global war on terror.[xxvi]

The 2009 outbreak of rioting in the Xinjiang capital Ürümqi, where Uyghurs protested against the state-incentivized migration of Han Chinese and religious repression policies, resulted in the death of nearly two hundred people.[xxvii] The 2009 riots marked a turning point in the CCP’s stance towards the Uyghurs as they viewed all Uyghurs as potential terrorists or sympathizers. Then, after Xi and CCP’s policies of Sinicization were passed in 2017, further religious restrictions were placed on Uyghurs.

A primary driving force behind the re-education camps in Xinjiang is the CCP party member Chen Quanguo, who was infamously involved in the religious crackdowns and state control over Buddhist monasteries in Tibet. Quanguo moved to Xinjiang in 2016 and has been instrumental in implementing re-education centers and intensified security measures in the region.[xxviii]

Economic Factors:

The Xinjiang region is rich in resources as the region produces over 80% of China’s cotton and has the largest natural gas and coal reserves in China.[xxix] Xinjiang is a critical node for China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is a massive infrastructure and economic project extending from Central Asia to Europe. In maintaining this infrastructure and economic project, the CCP aims to eradicate any separatist ideology from Xinjiang as it continues to develop the region as a massive port for the initiative as well as a hub for textiles and apparel manufacturing.[xxx] Human rights organizations have reported that many of the economic benefits that are derived from resource extraction in Xinjiang are disproportionately enjoyed by Han Chinese in the region, while Uyghurs and other religious minorities are increasingly marginalized.[xxxi]

CCP policies and initiatives in Xinjiang have increasingly pressured Uyghurs to accept factory positions in textile, agricultural, consumer electronics, apparel, and other labor-intensive industries in Xinjiang and other provinces.[xxxii] Those that refuse employment with these industries commonly face detention, and those already in detention centers face physical abuse. Many industries utilizing Uyghur forced labor have been tied to global supply chains, including companies such as Apple, Nike, Amazon, Costco, Microsoft, Calvin Klein, and many others.[xxxiii] However, recent legislation in the U.S. and other western nations has begun restricting companies’ use of forced labor in Xinjiang.

Mass Surveillance:

Several Human Rights Watch reports have cited that the Xinjiang region, like many other provinces in China, has turned into a surveillance state. The CCP has increasingly invested in and utilizes cutting-edge technology for monitoring its residents. The CCP has implemented a grid management surveillance system that splits villages and cities into squares of around 500 people.[xxxiv] These squares are then overseen by police stations in each one that consistently monitor residents by scanning their identifications cars, scanning their fingerprints, and searching their phones. These surveillance systems were introduced in Xinjiang by CCP member Chen Quanguo to monitor all activities and movements of Xinjiang residents.[xxxv]

In Xinjiang cities such as Kashgar, police checkpoints are placed every one-hundred yards, where facial recognition technology consistently scans those entering and leaving the premises. Furthermore, the government collects and stores all resident’s biometric data. Much of this biometric data in Xinjiang has been collected through required programs that are advertised as “Physicals for All.”[xxxvi] All biometric data, along with other pertinent information, is placed into a massive database that is used to create a so-called suspicious person list. In 2019, leaked classified Chinese documents revealed that more than fifteen thousand Xinjiang residents had been detained in June 2017 after the biometric database flagged these individuals to the suspicious person list.[xxxvii]

Global Response:

Many western nations have condemned China’s arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and other religious minorities in Xinjiang. The United Nations Human Rights Office has consistently pushed China to release those detained and disclose the location of those the government has disappeared. The UN Human Rights Office has claimed that what China has done in Xinjiang constitutes crimes against humanity, while other western nations, such as the U.S., have described such actions as cultural genocide.[xxxviii] Many western countries and the European Union have taken a stance against China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other religious minorities by sanctioning Chinese officials tied to rights abuses since 2017.

Furthermore, many nations have also placed manufacturing and supply chain restrictions to address the forced labor of Uyghurs.  The U.S. passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in 2021, which banned all imports from Xinjiang to prevent the funding of forced labor.[xxxix] The United Kingdom similarly passed laws that require U.K. businesses to ensure that their supply chains do not utilize forced labor. [xl]Additionally, the European Parliament passed legislation in 2022 that pressures EU nations to ban all imports that have been linked to forced labor in Xinjiang.

However, while many western nations have moved to address human rights abuses in Xinjiang, many of China’s partners have been largely silent on the issues in western China. Many of China’s partners, particularly central Asian nations where Islam is the primary religion, have prioritized their economic ties and strategic relationships with China over the human rights abuses committed. In June 2022, at the 50th session of the Human Rights Council, Cuba delivered a joint statement on behalf of 69 countries that called for the UN Human Rights Chief to stop pursuing China under human rights abuses by stating Xinjiang-related issues are the internal affairs of China and should not be the concern of the international community.[xli] Additionally, the joint statement also called the U.S. and other western nations out for politicizing the issue of human rights. Additionally, Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were among the 69 signatories of the joint statement, and these nations have also been highly criticized for condoning abuses.[xlii]  

Conclusion:

Since the CCP occupation of the Xinjiang Region, the Chinese government has consistently sought to eliminate Uygur culture and society in the region and eliminate other religious minorities throughout the country. For many decades, the CCP has feared the influence, particularly foreign influence, that comes with divergent religious groups in China. The CCP also fears the effects of separatist ideology on PRC society as it weakens government control over society. Through various religious repression policies and initiatives, the CCP has made a concerted effort to Sinicize the Xinjiang region. The recent Sinicization efforts have resulted in the mass internment and imprisonment of over 2 million Uyghurs and other religious minorities in Xinjiang. Horrific descriptions of the activities that occur in these re-education centers have reached western nations and have resulted in increased political and economic pressures placed on China and its officials tied to human rights abuses in Xinjiang. While claims have been made that argue that China is free to do what it wishes within its own boarders, more should be done to address the human rights abuses committed against the Uyghurs. Endnote

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[i] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[ii] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[iii] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[iv] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 6.

[v] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 8.

[vi] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[vii] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 2.

[viii] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 2.

[ix] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 2.

[x] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Human Rights”. Congressional Research Service. IF12265. January 6, 2023.

[xi] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[xii] Anand, A. (2022). Repression of Uyghur Muslims and the Freedom of Religious Beliefs in China. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 8(1), 29.

[xiii] Anand, A. (2022). Repression of Uyghur Muslims and the Freedom of Religious Beliefs in China. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 8(1), 29.

[xiv] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 3.

[xv] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 3.

[xvi] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 3.

[xvii] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 3.

[xviii] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 4.

[xix] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 5.

[xx] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 6.

[xxi] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 6.

[xxii] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 3.

[xxiii] Anand, A. (2022). Repression of Uyghur Muslims and the Freedom of Religious Beliefs in China. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 8(1), 28.

[xxiv] Anand, A. (2022). Repression of Uyghur Muslims and the Freedom of Religious Beliefs in China. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 8(1), 28.

[xxv] Anand, A. (2022). Repression of Uyghur Muslims and the Freedom of Religious Beliefs in China. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 8(1), 28.

[xxvi] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 7.

[xxvii] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Human Rights”. Congressional Research Service. IF12265. January 6, 2023.

[xxviii] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[xxix] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[xxx] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[xxxi] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 8.

[xxxii] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[xxxiii] Jacob Zinkula, “23 Major Brands Suspected of Illegally Sourcing Products Made by Forced Labor in China,” Business Insider (2022).

[xxxiv] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 9.

[xxxv] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 9.

[xxxvi] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 9.

[xxxvii] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 9.

[xxxviii] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Human Rights”. Congressional Research Service. IF12265. January 6, 2023.

[xxxix] Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023.

[xl] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 12.

[xli] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 12.

[xlii] Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), 12.

Bibliography

Anand, A. (2022). Repression of Uyghur Muslims and the Freedom of Religious Beliefs in China. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 8(1), 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/23944811221085680

Campbell, Caitlin, Susan Lawrence, and Karen Sutter. China and the World: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, (December 7, 2022). Retrieved from Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12271

Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Uyghurs.” Congressional Research Service. IF10281. January 6, 2023. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281

Lum, Thomas and Michael Weber. “China Primer: Human Rights”. Congressional Research Service. IF12265. January 6, 2023.https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12265

 Maizland, Lindsay. “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights#chapter-title-0-9.

Turkel, Nury, and Beth Van Schaack. “What America Owes the Uyghurs.” Foreign Affairs, January 10, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-07-16/what-america-owes-uyghurs?_gl=1%2A8yv5fz%2A_ga%2AMTk5OTI1Njg4OC4xNjc2NTg5ODYz%2A_ga_24W5E70YKH%2AMTY3Nzc3OTcxOS40LjAuMTY3Nzc3OTcxOS4wLjAuMA..

“Uyghur Groups Call for U.N. Action against China over Rights Abuses.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 16, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/uyghur-groups-call-un-action-against-china-over-rights-abuses-2023-02-16/.

“Who Are the Uyghurs and Why Is China Being Accused of Genocide?” BBC News. BBC, May 24, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037.

Xu, Beina, and Holly Fletcher. “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 2014. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim.

Zinkula, Jacob. “23 Major Brands Suspected of Illegally Sourcing Products Made by Forced Labor in China.” Business Insider. Business Insider, 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/companies-brands-china-supply-chains-illegal-forced-labor-2022-12.

February 11, 2023: Blood Libel: The Jewish Blood Drinking Conspiracy Dating Back to 1144 That Still Haunts Us by Madison Littlepage

What is Blood Libel and Where Does it Come From:

Blood libel is the accusation that Jews murder Christians – especially children – to use their blood for Jewish rituals, such as an ingredient for matzah (unleavened bread for Passover).[1] Jews were used as scapegoats for the murder and abuse of children, whose real killers were never brought to justice. These accusations are utterly unfounded and to most unbelievable, yet they contribute to the dense environment of anti-Semitism.

Drinking blood is expressly forbidden in the Torah, which is reflected in the Kashrut (Jewish dietary laws). Leviticus 7: 26-27 states, “Moreover you shall eat no blood whatever, whether of fowl or of animal, in any of your dwellings. Whoever eats any blood, that person shall be cut off from his people.”[2] So with clear evidence that Jews would not consume any blood, where does the rumor come from?

The first documented case of blood libel occurred in 1144 in Norwich, England. On Good Friday, the body of 12-year-old William was found, but no arrests were ever made. However, in 1150, a monk named Thomas of Monmouth came to Norwich to “investigate” William’s death. Thomas published a book, The Life and Passion of William of Norwich, where he claimed that Jews killed William as a stand-in for all Christians.[3] The timing surrounding blood libel cases is critical as many take place near important Jewish or Christian holidays, which is used to legitimize the use of why Jews are involved. William’s body being discovered on Good Friday, the day Jesus was crucified, underpinned Thomas’ argument that Jews were recreating the killing of Christ.

After Thomas publicized William’s death in his book, cases of blood libel began to spread across the European continent. In 1235, the town of Fulda of the Holy Roman Empire was rocked when five boys were killed in a fire. Although it was likely an accident, rumors quickly began to spread that Jews had drained the boys’ blood and then to cover up their transgressions, they set the fire. Due to these rumors, Crusaders killed 34 Jewish men and women. However, when word of the rumors and subsequent murder of Jews reached Emperor Frederick II’s ears, he investigated the accusations. Frederick enlisted the expertise of recent Jewish-to-Catholic converts to determine whether Jews drank blood for their rituals. Upon their recommendation, Emperor Fredrick absolved Jews from the killing of Christian children in 1236.[4] While it was too late for the executed Jews, this case set the first legal precedent that blood libel was non-credible.

Just over a decade later, Pope Innocent IV reiterated that Jews do not use blood for rituals after the death of 2-year-old Meilla of Valréas sparked rumors. Meilla was found dead during the Holy Week and there were claims that she was last seen alive on the Jewish street. Investigators arrested three Jews and tortured them until confessed to killing the girl for her blood.[5] The Pope’s intervention likely saved their lives and reaffirmed that Jews do not drink blood; however, blood libel was still a prevalent belief for the common, uneducated Christians.

The textbook case of blood libel is the 1475 gruesome murder of Simon of Trent. Simon was a toddler when his body was found in a canal under a Jewish house. The autopsy of Simon discovered that he had been repeatedly stabbed, including wounds on his penis. An imprisoned Jewish-to-Catholic convert claimed that Jews used blood in place of red wine and in their Passover bread. Authorities used this as evidence that Jews crucified Simon and extracted his blood. This led to the arrest, torture, and execution of almost all Jewish males in Trent and the forced conversion of all women and children.[6] The death of an innocent boy led to the death of an entire community.

As Europe expanded its influence, blood libel spread throughout the world. In 1840, Father Thomas, a Capuchin monk, disappeared in French-occupied Syria, which led to the arrest of eight Jews.[7] The first – and only – known case of blood libel in the US occurred in 1928 when 4-year-old Barbara Griffiths disappeared from her home in upstate New York. Accusations that Jews had kidnapped and murdered her quickly spread, but Griffiths was found just a day later after getting lost in the woods. However, the rumor that Jews were responsible persisted despite her reappearance.[8]

How Blood Libel Impacts Us Today:

The legacy of blood libel lingers still. In 2015, the British Movement (a white supremacist group) went to the Lincoln Cathedral to honor “Little Hugh of Lincoln,” a boy whose death in 1255 was blamed on Jews.[9] On the last day of Passover in April 2019, a gunman killed one and injured others at the Poway synagogue in California. Prior to the attack, the perpetrator published a manifesto stating, “You are not forgotten Simon of Trent, the horror that you and countless children have endured at the hands of the Jews will never be forgiven.”[10] The perpetrator invoking Simon of Trent’s name proves that blood libel continues to have deadly consequences.

On December 4, 2016, Edgar Maddison Welch entered the Comet Ping Pong Pizzeria in Washington, D.C. and fired an AR-15.[11] This event, more commonly known as Pizzagate, was rooted in blood libel and the release of the Clinton campaign’s emails a month prior. James Alefantis, the owner of the pizza joint, raised money for both the Obama and Hillary Clinton presidential campaigns. Therefore, Alefantis’ name appeared in the Wikileaks. A conspiracy theory began in 4chan that a cabal of Democratic party leaders used the basement of Alefantis’ pizza place – which does not have a basement –to conduct Satanic rituals and sexually abuse children. Michael Flynn, Trump’s national security advisor nominee, strengthen this narrative with his tweets that Clinton’s campaign manager drank children’s blood.[12] Pizzagate is the most high-profile case of blood libel influences in the 21^st century and contributed to the founding of QAnon. QAnon is essentially repackaged anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that have existed for centuries for a modern audience.

How to Combat Blood Libel:

Countering the blood libel narrative is difficult because most people have either never heard of it or immediately dismiss the idea of Jews drinking blood. It is also imperative to remember that blood libel is just one aspect of anti-Semitism. It must be a team effort to combat blood libel and anti-Semitism at large. It takes the justice system to investigate and prosecute those responsible to deter future instances. Social media companies have made – and must continue to make – efforts to combat general blood libel. In the summer of 2020, TikTok, Reddit, Facebook, and Twitter began banning tags like #Pizzagate and barring known QAnon ideologues from their platforms.[13] However, the best way to combat blood libel is through religious education. Much as Emperor Frederick II and Pope Innocent, religious leaders must instill that anti-Semitic actions are wrong to their congregations.

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[1] “Blood Libel: A False, Incendiary Claim Against Jews,” Anti-Defamation League, November 30, 2012, https://www.adl.org/resources/glossary-term/blood-libel-false-incendiary-claim-against-jews?gclid=CjwKCAiA85efBhBbEiwAD7oLQAOwVqMxr36hhGPr-5wxydiaPOfcKbJqq3ZwTNvfDSMNwrocp6QKXBoCKRUQAvD_BwE.

[2] “Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws,” accessed on February 9, 2023, https://www2.kenyon.edu/Depts/Religion/Projects/Reln91/Blood/Judaism/kashrut/kashrut.htm#:~:text=The%20Torah%20explicitly%20prohibits%20the,is%20contained%20in%20the%20blood.&text=%22Moreover%20you%20shall%20eat%20no,cut%20off%20from%20his%20people.%22.

[3] Magda Teter, Blood Libel: On the Trial of an Antisemitic Myth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020).

[4] Teter, Blood Libel: On the Trial of an Antisemitic Myth.

[5] Teter, Blood Libel: On the Trial of an Antisemitic Myth.

[6] Teter, Blood Libel: On the Trial of an Antisemitic Myth.

[7] Kalman, Julie. “Sensuality, Depravity, and Ritual Murder: The Damascus Blood Libel and Jews in France.” Jewish Social Studies 13, no. 13, Spring/Summer 2007.

[8] Renee Ghert-Zand, “How a missing girl and an atmosphere of hate brought a blood libel to US Shores,” Times of Israel, September 10, 2019,

https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-1928-sole-us-case-of-blood-libel-was-incited-in-ny-by-a-lost-4-year-old-girl/

[9] Teter, Blood Libel: On the Trial of an Antisemitic Myth.

[10] Talia Lavin, “The San Diego shooter’s manifesto is a modern form of an old lie about Jews,” Washington Post, April 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/29/san-diego-shooters-manifesto-is-modern-form-an-old-lie-about-jews/.

[11] Amanda Robb, “Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal,” Rolling Stone, November 16, 2017, https://www.rollingstone.com/feature/anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scandal-125877/.

[12] Paul Bleakley, “Panic, pizza and mainstreaming the alt-right: A social media analysis of Pizzagate and the rise of the QAnon conspiracy,” Sage Journals, July 29, 2021.

[13] Bleakley, “Panic, pizza and mainstreaming the alt-right.”

November 4, 2022: “Censorship in the Hindu Nationalist’s India,” Kayla Malcy

2021 saw the Swedish V-Dem Institute downgrade India from an “electoral democracy” to an “electoral autocracy” and the U.S. based Freedom House downgrading India from a “free democracy” to a “partially free democracy.” Currently, India’s 2022 Freedom House score sits at 66/100. India only scored 2 out of 4 points on issues such as free and independent media, freedom of religion, academic freedom, and freedom of assembly. These areas have been deliberately attacked by Hindu nationalists and are a key part of India’s recent democratic backsliding.

Since the BJP came to power in 2014, Hindu nationalist political parties and civil organizations have challenged the validity of minority rights and the freedom of expression. Their focus on anti-Muslim rhetoric and censorship of political opposition encompasses many fields. PM Narendra Modi’s government and organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its student branch, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), among others, have engaged in censorship of academics, journalists, filmmakers, and protestors alike. Across the various fields, the reasoning and justification for censorship has been the same.

Much of Hindu nationalist censorship relies on the Indian Penal Code which was drafted by the British Colonial Government in 1860. Section 295A of Indian Penal Code, in particular, is used to justify censorship. Section 295A states:

            [Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of an class of [citizens of Indi]), [by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to [three years], or with fine, or with both.]

Section 295A leaves the definition of “outraging the religious feelings” wide open for interpretation. In addition to a broad definition for “outraging religious feelings”, these cases are not civil but criminal, creating severe and wide-ranging consequences for those found to be guilty.

Academia

In academia, cases resulting in book bans have been brought against many prominent scholars. Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus: an Alternative History and On Hinduism were both targeted by Hindu nationalist activists. Doniger’s publisher, Penguin Books India, struggled with a lawsuit filed by Hindu nationalist educational activist Dinanath Batra for 4 years before relenting and suspending sales of The Hindus: an Alternative History in India. Many publishers will not even fight the lawsuits and some even go so far as to self-censor due to the prevalence of threats of violence. Hindu nationalist student group ABVP vandalized and attacked history department staff at the University of Delhi over the inclusion of ‘Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three thoughts on Translation’ by A.K. Ramanujan on the university reading list. All the above books were targeted for having content that conservative Hindus did not agree with.

Other targets of censorship include Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India by James W. Laine, One Part Woman by Perumal Murgan, From Plassey to Partition and After: A History of Modern India by Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, and Communalism and Sexual Violence: Ahmedabad since 1969 by Megha Kumar. All of these were either targeted by Hindu nationalist advocates or by publishers afraid of the reactions of these activists. The majority of the banned or censored texts here cover Indian history, which Hindu nationalists wish to mold to better fit their ideology, or sensitive social issues such as gender and sex.

Film

Similar censorship can be seen in films. In India every film must pass the Central Board of Film Certification to be viewed in theaters and released in stores. Anything that is considered as “outraging religious feelings” or addressing a sensitive social issue may be banned either country wide or in a specific state, often through Hindu nationalist activism. Gujarat in particular has banned films such as Parzania and Firaaq. Both films center on the 2002 Gujarat Riots, in which somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 people, mainly Muslims, were killed. This widespread communal violence carried on for 3 days. At the time current PM Modi was the Minister of Gujarat. This event is both a sensitive social issue and one that puts the current political party in poor light. As such local Hindu nationalist groups petitioned successfully for its ban.

Films are not just banned for portraying religious and ethnic violence but a plethora or other social issues that “outrage religious feelings”. The 2016 film Lipstick Under My Burkha was banned for displaying young women’s sexuality. In 2005 Water was banned for its focus on difficult topics such as child marriage and a widow’s status in society. A year later the film The Pink Mirror was banned for its portrayal of drag performers. One genre often targeted, with mixed results, is historical dramas. These films become targets of violence and smear campaigns for their portrayal of historical Hindu women and Hindu and Muslim kings. Rajput Hindu nationalist group Sri Rajput Karni Sena (SRSK) attacked the set of Bajirao Mastani in Jaipur over an alleged romantic dream scene between a Rajput noblewoman and a Muslim king. The set was later attacked again by another group in Kolhapur. Despite this the film was still one of the highest grossing in its year.

Social media

One of the BJP’s biggest and most volatile battlefields for censorship is social media platforms. In addition to censoring content that does not align with the party’s beliefs, the BJP must combat rampant misinformation which can lead to mob violence. The Government has been consistently increasing the pressure on social media companies to comply with censorship. In February of 2021 the Government unveiled the new IT Rules as part of the IT Act. The new rules require social media companies to report on misinformation monthly, comply with quick content removal requirements, and investigate first originators of misinformation. This spurred concerns that companies would be required to perform what essentially amounts to mass surveillance. In order to find first originators, companies would need to trace every message sent and thus end-to-end encryption would not be viable for messaging platforms. Additionally, the new rules make executives of social media criminally liable for noncompliance.

One of the companies that had the most intense issue with the new IT Rules was Twitter. Twitter has been a recent target of both crackdowns on misinformation and for Government directed censorship. In 2021, Twitter labeled some BJP official tweets of a fake “media toolkit” supposedly used by the National Congress party as “manipulated media.” When asked by the Government to take this label off, Twitter refused and soon found its New Delhi office the target of a police raid. Additionally, Twitter was asked by the Indian government to block over 500 accounts, many of which belonged to political opposition, activists, and journalists.

Journalism

Twitter bans are not the only form of censorship that journalists have encountered. Many have been arrested and investigated under false pretenses for offenses such as “receiving stolen digital resources” under the IT Act. Journalists also face travel bans, harassment by the authorities, and have been attacked at Hindu nationalist rallies. On April 7, journalists were attacked at a Hindutva rally in Delhi. Members of the crowd took the journalists equipment while they conducted interviews, called them “jihadis,” and physically accosted them. Journalist Arbab Ali stated that he and other journalists were forced to delete recordings of the event. When police tried to intervene, they too were attacked by the rally members. Stories like this are increasingly common as the BJP and Hindu nationalist groups continue their efforts to censor media.

Internet Outages

In addition to censoring online content, the BJP has impeded the creation of content and community communication through the implementation of extensive internet and mobile service blackouts. The most prominent examples of this are blackouts put in place during the 2020-2021 Farmers Protests and right before the removal of article 370, which gave Jammu & Kashmir its autonomy. During the Farmers Protest the government shutdown mobile internet services in various locations around Delhi “to maintain public safety.” This only angered farmers more. In August 2019, internet, mobile, and landline services were cut to Kashmir in anticipation of the removal of article 370. The BJP aimed to keep public unrest to a minimum, however this prolonged suppression of people’s voices did not help. Despite the Indian Supreme Court ruling that internet services could not be suspended indefinitely in early 2020, internet services were not completely restored for 18 months. This delay impeded communications, business, and created more contempt for the Indian government and the BJP.

BJP and Hindu nationalist censorship has cast a wide net. The Government and Hindu nationalist activists have covered everything from academia to film to social media. Journalists continue to struggle to freely report on pertinent issues within the country and political opposition is censored. With recent laws like the IT Rules and the archaic remnants of colonial law, such as the Indian Penal Code, the Government has many options to justify its censorship. The ever-increasing crack downs on journalists, social media, and political opposition will need to halt if India wants to regain its title as an electoral and free democracy. It remains to be seen whether or not the BJP will be able to, or is even interested in, addressing the freedom of religion and freedom of speech issues that have degraded India’s democratic standing in the world.

Citations

Biswas, Soutik. “’Electoral Autocracy’: The Downgrading of India’s Democracy.” BBC News. BBC, March 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56393944.

Express Web Desk. “Restoration of Internet Services in Jammu and Kashmir: A Timeline.” The Indian Express, February 5, 2021. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jk-4g-internet-mobile-timeline-7176408/.

Frayer, Lauren, and Shannon Bond. “India and Tech Companies Clash over Censorship, Privacy and ‘Digital Colonialism’.” NPR. NPR, June 10, 2021. https://www.npr.org/2021/06/10/1004387255/india-and-tech-companies-clash-over-censorship-privacy-and-digital-colonialism.

Gettleman, Jeffrey, Vindy Goel, and Maria Abi-Habib. “Https://Www-Nytimes-Com.proxygw.wrlc.org/2019/12/17/World/Asia/India-Internet-Modi-Protests.html.” The New York Times, December 17, 2019. https://www-nytimes-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/2019/12/17/world/asia/india-internet-modi-protests.html.

“Indian Authorities Arrest 2 Journalists over Coverage of Leaked School Exams; Reporters Attacked Covering Delhi Demonstration.” Committee to Protect Journalists, April 7, 2022. https://cpj.org/2022/04/indian-authorities-arrest-2-journalists-over-coverage-of-leaked-school-exams-reporters-attacked-covering-delhi-demonstration/.

“India: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2022.

“India: Media Freedom under Threat.” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/india-media-freedom-under-threat.

Panda, Aditya Kumar. “CASE STUDY: FILM CENSORSHIP IN INDIA.” Scholedge International Journal of Business Policy & Governance ISSN 2394-3351 4, no. 2 (2017): 7–.Taylor, McComas. “Hindu Activism and Academic Censorship in India.” South Asia 37, no. 4 (2014): 717–725.

Scroll Staff. “Journalists Attacked at Hindutva Event in Delhi as Mob Calls Muslim Reporters ‘Jihadi’.” Scroll.in. Scroll.in, April 3, 2022. https://scroll.in/latest/1020989/seven-journalists-attacked-at-hindutva-event-in-delhi-as-mob-calls-muslim-journalists-jihadi.

Soni, Paroma. “Online Censorship Is Growing in Modi’s India.” Columbia Journalism Review, December 14, 2021. https://www.cjr.org/investigation/modi-censorship-india-twitter.php.

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