Category: Student Events

October 7, 2022: “Pakistani Madrassas: A Real Pathway to Islamic Terrorism in the 21st Century” Steven Atwood

Background:

Madrassas are Islamic seminaries in Pakistan. There are two narratives about them: the first and most common in the “West” is that madrassas are de facto brain-washing facilities for young men to become terrorists. The other, less well-known, narrative is that these schools are equivalent to community centers, sources of additional learning, and are generally beneficial to the community. At madrassas, students of all ages have an Islamic education. They learn Arabic, to read and write, and subjects related to the Quran and its interpretation. They are popular for multiple reasons such as feeding and housing their students for free, the teacher may have a strong reputation of religious instruction, and parents want their children having such an education. The first reason has made them viable or the only resort for Pakistan’s poorest. 

The first narrative has some historical roots: Generally, madrassas are Sunni and follow the Deobandi sect. This sect is particularly popular in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Madrassas exploded in popularity after President-General Zia-ul-Haq rose to power in 1977. He funded Deobandi madrassas, turning them into an integral part of the Pakistani educational system, which grew in enrollment due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the 80s, Saudi Arabia (and the United States to support the Mujahideen) also began to fund madrassas as a countermeasure to Iran’s nurturing of Pakistan’s Shia minority. During this period of massive growth and in part due to Saudi funding, prominent al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders studied in Deobandi madrassas. Here, Deobandi ideology was combined with Wahabism or Pashtun ideals, the hallmark of the Taliban. Due to the learning system of memorization and removal of individual will, fanaticism could easily take root. This was aimed at anyone the teacher labels an infidel, possibly priming students for Islamist terrorism.

Post 9/11, due to US pressure and financial aid, along with the image that madrassas were a fundamentalist institution that breed terrorists, changes were introduced in Pakistan. Then leader of Pakistan, President-General Musharraf tried to reform the madrassas, shifting them from the Islamization of Zia-ul-Haq to Modernization through the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board and the Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002 which proved ineffective.  

Madrassas and the Pakistani Education System in the last 2 Decades

Madrassas are a regular part of daily life in Pakistan, educating students from poorer areas and families. The main schools are: Wahabi, Deobandi (15% of the population but 60% of madrassas), Barelvi (25% of madrassas but most Pakistanis follow this), Jamat-i-Islami, and Jafria-Shia. Due to the functions provided by madrassas, the economically depressed, vulnerable, and impressionable youth of Pakistan tend to attend madrassas. However, a major reason for attending are the parents who want their child to retain a religious education. The Pakistani education system has a 3-tier system: expensive private schools taught in English focused on secular subjects, generally low-quality public schools taught in Urdu/English that teaches secular subjects with Islamic influences, and madrassas at the lowest level. The ratio of madrassa attendees to private and public students is 1:38:104 respectively. This ratio has led some scholars such as William Dalrymple and Tahir Andradi to argue that indoctrination takes place in notorious centers of radicalization and that the total number of students indoctrinated by madrassas are too few to have a major impact. Sageman in 2004 found that only 18% of Islamist extremists had an Islamic primary or secondary education, meaning that most of them went to secular schools. According to Tariq, 3 madrassas are the main schools for Islamic terrorism: the Haqqani Madrassa in the Haqqani Complex, the Noori Madrassa, and the Panjpiri Madrassa. 

In part, there is a strong correlation between madrassas and religiously motivated violence through studies done by Ali in 2009 and Fair in 2007. Fair, however, however argues that less than a quarter of militants ever attended madrassas in the first place. The madrassa is, according to Angeles and Aijazi, in the best case an esteemed pillar of the neighborhood (and even beyond). One, the JOAQ mosque-madrassa complex in an affluent part of Islamabad, has a prayer hall, a Darul Iftah, an ablution facility, but also shopping plazas, banks, a private hospital, and retail stores. Another madrassa in Islamabad, IIS, offers the secular national curriculum along with traditional Islamic studies. Interviewing students from both schools, a prime reason for their attendance in these madrassas was the poor education quality not just of their local madrassa(s) but of public education as well. Another was the opportunity of being enrolled in school while being in a city.  

Conclusion

Madrassas, while starting out as important locations for Islamic extremism and terrorism particularly between the 70s and the 90s, are not necessarily the places that the “West” has painted them as. While officially the Pakistani education system has a 3-tier system, common knowledge ascribes that it could almost be a 2-tier system of private schools and madrassas tied with public schools based on the low-quality of the latter. It is not determined that madrassas are inherently peaceful schools of Islamic studies without any Islamist extremism.  There are many madrassas that can still have students come out of it with strong conservative and hateful ideology such as antisemitism and anti-West sentiment. On the other hand, due to the wide variety of madrassas and the skill of the teachers to filter out possible would-be extremists, there are many madrassas that do not have these students. The narrative that madrassas are common dens of extremism with students ready to have jihad with the “West” does not stand up to scrutiny in the 21^st century. 

Tavernise, Sabrina “Pakistan’s Islamic Schools Fill Void, but Fuel Militancy” New York Times, May 3, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/world/asia/04schools.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 

Commins, David. The wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia. (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005.) 191–2. 

Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The trail of political Islam. (Harvard University Press, 2002.) 102–3, 224-225.

Kadayifci-Orellana, S. Ayse. “Islamic perspective: Religion in Pakistan’s internal conflicts.” In On the Significance of Religion in Conflict and Conflict Resolution, pp. 65-68. Routledge, 2020.

EFSAS, EFSAS. “How Pakistani Madrassas Contribute to Radicalization Dynamics and Religious Terrorism in Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir Introduction.” (2019). 11

Angeles, Leonora C., and Omer Aijazi. “Revisiting the Madrassa Question in Pakistan: Worlding Lived Religion and Religious Education in Urban Spaces.” Humanity & Society 43, no. 3 (2019): 304-306, 308-312.

“After Decades, Pakistan Finally Completes The Madrassa Reforms”. 2022. Times Of Islamabad. https://timesofislamabad.com/30-Jan-2018/after-decades-pakistan-finally-completes-the-madrassa-reforms. 

International Crisis Group. “THE MANY FACETS OF KARACHI’S MADRASAS.” PAKISTAN: KARACHI’S MADRASAS AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM. International Crisis Group, 2007. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep38329.7.

Tariq, Mohamed. 2022. “Events – Afghanistan: Fighting The Taliban – June – 2016 – Hudson Institute”. Hudson.Org. https://www.hudson.org/events/1348-afghanistan-fighting-the-taliban62016.  

March 04, 2022: “The Culpability of Religion – Reviewing the Impact of Theravada Buddhism on Thai Sex Trafficking and Prostitution” Noah Kurzenhauser, MA Security Policy.

Setting 

Approximately 95% of Thailand is Buddhist, specifically practicing the Theravada doctrine.¹ Built into the national culture, and undoubtedly influenced by Theravada’s central tenets, is an emphasis on the personal cultivation of success. Although success may certainly be tangible in nature (e.g., the accumulation of money), Thai individuals appear to be more concerned with achieving individual enlightenment. This success, a life-long process, indicates a mending of karma and an adherence to the Buddha’s principles. Additionally, Buddhism itself has become increasingly ingrained within the country’s political fabric and retains its status as one of Thailand’s three core pillars. 

Thailand also boasts one of the world’s largest sex trades. Although the specific number ebbs and flows, an oft-used 2015 analysis by Havoscope found the trade to be valued at around 6.4 billion dollars; a more conservative estimate, other organizations have believed the number to be much higher.² In 1988, data from the International Labour Organization suggested that “sex tourism” contributed between 2-14% of the Southeast Asia’s GDP, with Thailand reaching nearly 3%.³ This number is now estimated to exceed 10% of the country’s GDP, indicating the substantial growth the trade has undergone.⁴ Although prostitution itself remains a contentious political debate, what makes this status quo concerning is the sheer number of trafficking victims present in the trade and the age of these sex workers; several reports have alleged that between 30,000 and 40,000 of individuals in the trade were minors. 

Although seemingly two separate topics, this brief makes the case that Buddhism – with its definition of karma and current status within Thai politics – has both indirectly sanctioned/permitted and even directly profited from the sex trade. 

Buddhism-Sex Trade Nexus 

Although critical to note that the large majority of temples do excellent work within communities, the larger culture around mending one’s karma and contributing to these temples financially is certainly related to the Thai sex trade. The primary argument is as follows: women, within Thailand, are thought to be born karmically inferior to their male counterparts. To mend one’s karma, individuals are encouraged to contribute to the temples via almsgiving and other related practices. Women, unlike men, however, are not permitted to become ordained as monks, a common practice for mending karma. Although women can be ordained as nuns, the religious impact varies from that of a monk. Thus, women are born karmically inferior to men and are being instructed to mend that karma while simultaneously not being provided options to do so. What some women end up doing, then, is entering the sex trade; money earned is sent back to families, some of which is then diverted to almsgiving. There have also been cases, albeit less so, of temples actively being involved within the trade and utilizing dirty money. one such example saw the establishment of a seven-story building on monastery grounds that was entirely funded through prostitution dollars.⁵ 

A final note of curiosity concerns the existence of the Buddhist third precept: refraining from sexual misconduct. Little information can be found as to why prostitution and the sex trade, more generally, are allowed to commence under this guiding philosophy. How can prostitution be considered a viable manner in which to mend karma within Thai Buddhist Society? Upon this point receiving further consideration and attention, Thai Buddhism will need to entertain expanding possibilities for women to mend karma within the religion itself. In addition, and although rather unprecedented, it might be wise for Buddhist leadership within the country to release joint remarks acknowledging the existence of this issue. 

Policy Recommendations 

It is first imperative that any policy recommendations aiming to, at the very least, understand the unique nature of this situation recognize and subsequently respect the inseparable relationship between Buddhism and Thailand’s central government. It is simply infeasible to implement a policy response on the prostitution-religion nexus without both enaging and listening to the religious political elite. Further, policy practitioners are forced to walk a tenuous tightrope between pressure and alienation when it comes to addressing the Buddhist temples’ societal ills and internal problems. Simply put, crafting efficacious policy that addresses the multi-dimensional nature of this crisis presents immense difficulties. The policy recommendations that follow are merely starting points for further discussion and ideas that attempt to isolate the core areas needing – or perhaps remain vulnerable to – substantive change. 

1) Regulating temple financing. Thai temples rely heavily on alms giving; original tradition states the purpose of alms giving as food collection, though money is often provided as a substitute. Additional, and as previous criminal corruption cases brought forth by the government illustrate, some of the funds gathered by monks may be directly or indirectly tied to prostitution and sex trafficking. Although the 1962 Sangha Bill requires temples to conduct internal auditing, monks have rebuffed attempts to build this infrastructure into their temples and truly keep track of where money is going and, most importantly, where money is coming from (e.g. families of a lower socioeconomic status who may have daughters working in the sex trade, for instance). This paper recommends the regulation of temple financing, a policy that was attempted in the past. Implemented by the military junta in 2017, it received wide-spread support due to the massive corruption found within temples. The only resistance posed came from several prominent senior monks, who based their opposition on the allegedly invasive nature of government regulation of religious practice. Complicating the veracity of their opposition is the reality that Thai temples are able to petition the government for funding for various projects (e.g. education, Buddhism outreach, temple restoration); in 2017 this financial assistance was 2.6 million baht. If an entity is receiving governmental funding, regulation is both necessary and critical 

2) Introducing socially-engaged Buddhism.Temples undoubtedly play a significant role within Thai society, building connections with the local populace and serving as a place of refuge (physically, mentally, or spiritually) for many civilians. Unfortunately, however, many of these temples struggle with truly involving themselves in the community and working to rectify spiritual ills. Within the premise of Theravada doctrine, it may be beneficial to engage religious authorities on the sociopolitical level and recenter some of its most fundamental tenets. This is a form of Buddhism known as “Socially Engaged Buddhism,” a practice that fits within the Theravada doctrine. The essential focus is to engage oneself with the fundamental processes underlying social functions, ills, and inequities; put differently, social justice is applied through a Buddhist lens. Inviting religious leaders to serve as key players, helping create social policy while refocusing their doctrine’s attention towards elevating those in poverty, may diminish their reliance on prostitution money. In addition, renovating the Buddhist approach to social issues like the sex trade may force governmental action and legitimize the religion’s political presence. Simply, instead of waiting on Buddhist authorities to decide whether entertaining discussion on prostitution and sex trafficking is worth their time – as well as the status of women within their understanding of karma – policy makers can take charge and invite them to participate as legitimate stakeholders.

¹ Thailand. (2022, March 8). CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/thailand/

² Amendral, A. (2021, February 3). How The Pandemic Has Upended The Lives Of Thailand’s Sex Workers. NPR.

³ Sex industry assuming massive proportions in Southeast Asia. (1998, August 19). International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_007994/lang–en/index.htm

⁴ Narula, A. (2019, October 24). What you want to see is what you get: realities, representations, and reputations of sex tourism in Bangkok. London School of Economics – Engenderings. 

⁵ Avila, S. (2008). “Buddhism and its relation to women and prostitution in Thai society.” FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations.

Listen to an audio of Noah’s talk below

February 4, 2022: “Understanding Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism” by Evan Talit

Background

New attitudes and movements around the globe towards the world’s only Jewish state, Israel, have led to debates from Capitol Hill to college campuses and every level in between. It can be assumed correctly that the Arab-Israeli conflict is directly linked to many of these views, however some argue that their beliefs and movement go beyond the State of Israel as it exists today. Antizionist protests were seen around the globe following the uptick in clashes between Hamas and Israel in May of 2021. Antizionism comes in different forms and cannot be covered with a broad-brush, but critics can be found around the globe claiming that antizionism is antisemitism in disguise, and has taken the mantle of veiled antisemitic movements that have been a part of history. These debates can and should be had on their merits, however an understanding of the different ideologies and actors involved should be considered when discussing possible connections to antisemitic attitudes or movements. Like much in the modern era, the debate has been marred by dis/misinformation, including movements on social media, domestic political divides, and a whole host of issues that come with the nature of debate around Israel/Palestine. The legitimacy of anti-Zionist views has been disputed and still is, including the more recent relationships between anti-Zionist movements and prominent individuals and antisemitism. Other views regarding the various forms of anti-Zionism have also been discussed and debated and should not be lumped together as one. 

Modern History of Antizionism

There is already debate around the word ‘Zionism’ itself is. Naturally, there is debate around what ‘antizionism’ is. Of course, getting beyond semantic debates it is important to acknowledge that these meanings are, and should be, largely based on the context of how, and sometimes who, is using them. ‘Modern’ Antizionism is defined as opposition to Zionism, and since 1948 is broadly defined as opposition to The State of Israel and opposition to the Jewish community in the land of Israel’s search for self-determination before 1948. To a lesser extent, but certainly before 1948, modern antizionism is represented as opposition to the political movements of Jews towards self-determination (within or outside of modern Israel). Antizionist movements have differing ideologies and goals that are often linked to where or when the movements were started. Looking at differing nations/groups that have advocated against the modern Zionist movement have similar scopes regarding the State of Israel but generally have commonality in outlook on the nation itself. These include Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Soviet, British/British Colonial, Pan-Arab, and African-American groups have had antizionist movements around the globe.

Zionism and Antizionism in Judaism

Hope for the return to the land of Israel is in the content of the Jewish religion, which is known as Aliyah. For Jews in the diaspora Israel was religiously revered paralleled with traditional religious beliefs. The return remained a common theme in religious life, ending Yom Kippur and Passover prayers with “Next year in Jerusalem.” The Jewish enlightenment period, ending in the end of the 18^th century begat a new line of thinking that included dropping traditional beliefs around Aliyah. From that point on, Zionism rekindled the beliefs around Aliyah largely through a political and pragmatic ideological sense, but keeping it parallel with traditional Jewish beliefs. Support for Aliyah did not and still does not mean support for immigration, but most of the diaspora find themselves today within the diaspora. Support for the modern Zionist movement is not universal – some religious and secular jews do not support antizionism, but does not necessarily make them antizionists, as many still support the choice or ideology itself. 

Antizionism and Linkage with Antisemitism

In the early 21st century, it was originally claimed that a new antisemitism had emerged that is/was rooted in anti-Zionism. Advocates of this viewpoint argue that much of what they claim to be criticism of Israel and Zionism is aimed at the demonization of Israel, and has led to an international resurgence of attacks on Jews and Jewish symbols and an increased acceptance of antisemitic beliefs in public discourse, particularly around times of heightened tensions in the Middle East. While it is true that heightened tensions in Israel and Palestine have led to Antisemitic incidents in other parts of the world, some also argue that as evidence of Antizionist movements to create an environment that antisemitism is more tolerated or excused. Some who argue this viewpoint do not take issue with antizionist ideologies themselves, but argue that the movement has not done enough to distance itself from antisemitism in general. 

Critics of those claims suggest that the characterization of anti-Zionism as antisemitic is inaccurate and sometimes obscures legitimate criticism of Israel’s policies and actions and trivializes antisemitism. Realistically, both can be true at the same time given the nature of the claims. It is important to understand two of the major themes in accusations of antisemitism linked with antizionism, as the arguments largely fall into one of two categories – sometimes both. The first is that Antizionism is part of a larger movement to delegitimize Jews and their right to self-determination in what many feel is their historic homeland. This argument does not necessarily assume that antizionists are antisemites, but that the movement itself is rooted in antisemitism. The second argument is that antizionism is an ideology that creates an environment of antisemitism in doing too much to equate Jews with the State of Israel. While this is something that is seen around the globe, the argument itself does not criticize per se the legitimacy of antizionism as a standalone issue. 

Where We Stand Today

This issue has become a domestic political issue in many countries, particularly the UK and the United States. It is not nearly a complete divide between right and left, but there does seem to be some movement of division on this issue between left wing and right-wing movements in the West in particular.  Movement on this issue ebbs and flows with the events in the region. Unfortunately, there has been a reoccurring cycle of violence for the last 20 years without any major peace talks coming to fruition. This is an issue that is not directly connected to the lives of many Americans, while still being a hot-button issue from time to time – all while there are more major events in the Middle East that include direct US involvement. However, these movements domestically and abroad exist on their own, even though debate heats up when there is an uptick in escalation of events in Israel/Palestine.

Listen to Evan’s talk below:

November 5, 2021: Saudi Arabia and Iran – Sectarianism in the Middle East

Background

            Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932 and built its legitimacy on religion, being the custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina and the ruler of the Muslim world. The Imperial State of Iran was formed in 1925 and ruled by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an autocratic ruler who received ample support from the United States. The Nixon administration sought to rely primarily on cooperation with regional states to protect fundamental US interests worldwide.[1] In the Gulf, it decided to rely on Iran and Saudi Arabia, the ‘twin pillars of the Middle East, as both countries received substantial military supply from the US. Saudi Arabia and Iran witnessed relatively stable yet icy relations due to Iran’s recognition and stance over Israel as well as the natural regional competition between one another.

The Iranian revolution

            In 1979, the Iranian revolution occurred, which led to the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran by Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini claimed that this was a revolution for the Islamic world and that he was the leader of the Islamic world.[2] He called for the overthrow of the illegitimate monarchies, especially encouraging the Saudis.[3] This was a direct threat to young Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy as it based it on being the leader of the Muslim world, and Khomeini’s statements were directly attacking it. This was the very beginning of the ideological animosity between the two countries.

Additionally, under the new Islamic Republic of Iran, it follows Velayat-e-faqih (guardianship of the jurist). It is a system of governance that transfers all political and religious authority to the Shia clergy.[4] The Supreme Leader makes all the State’s (and the Islamic world’s) vital decisions as he is the only one able to prove guardianship over the nation until the return of the 12^th Imam.[5] This essentially bounds the loyalty of the region’s Shiites to Tehran rather than their home countries, which is a direct threat to Saudi Arabia as it has a sizeable Shiite population.

Competition  

Both countries were competing for regional influence on how the region and the Muslim world should be ruled based on their versions of Islam. This was a fight for power through the lenses of religion. In order to curtail Iranian influence, Saudi Arabia funded Madrasas and exported Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world, engaged in proxy wars against Iran, and leveraged its special relationship with the US. As for Iran, to curtail Saudi’s influence, it exported its revolution worldwide and created and garnered proxies throughout the region to achieve its regional goals.

Saudi curtailment of Iranian influence

Funding Madrasas and exporting Wahhabism

In response to the direct threat the new Islamic Iranian revolution posed on the Saudi regime and its claim of being the leader of the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia began to export its version of Islam, Wahhabism. It is an ultra-conservative, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam that supports a literalist interpretation and implementation of Sharia and rejects all other sects and forms of Islam.[6] This was the perfect ideology to combat the Shiite ideology as it would naturally completely reject it. Saudi Arabia spent approximately $100 billion over the past couple of decades to spread Wahhabism throughout the world through funding madrasas, mosques, imams, imam learning centers, and cultural learning.[7] Additionally, Wahhabism spread within Saudi Arabia as well, as the Wahhabi clergy gained significant powers and began Islamizing the society, focusing on anti-Shiite rhetoric and sectarian sentiment in all aspects of society.

Engaging in Proxy Wars

In order to avoid direct confrontation with Iran, Saudi Arabia backed proxies to combat Iran’s hegemonic pursuit in countries such as Lebanon and Syria. The very first instance of this is during the Iran-Iraq war. After the Iranian revolution, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein launched a war against Iran to get rid of the new Islamic republic hoping it was unstable and exhausted post-revolution and Saudi Arabia sponsored Iraq through economic and military aid.[8] The war was significant in cementing the new Iranian regime because it reinforced its narrative. Iraq committed mass atrocities, used chemical weapons, and committed many war crimes;[9] however, the US continued supporting Iraq, and the UN repeatedly refused to name Iraq responsible for violating international law. The war was a traumatic experience as over a million people died, and everyone was affected by the war. This reinforced Iran’s anti-imperialist and anti-west ideology as the war showed it alone.

In 2014, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels launched a coup 2014 to overthrow the Saudi-backed Yemeni government of Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi and took over Sanaa, Yemen’s capital. Saudi Arabia feared having an Iranian proxy close to its Southern border as this was a major national and security threat. The Houthis were the perfect opportunity for Iran to inflict a high cost on Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it launched a counterinsurgency coalition campaign to restore the Yemeni government and defeat the Houthis that is ongoing to this day. Iran has repeatedly used the Houthis to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia and target its infrastructure, oil facilities, and American interests. one of many attacks the Houthis launched was an attack on Saudi’s Abha airport in 2019 that killed one civilian and wounded 21 others.[10]

Leveraging its special relationship with the US

The US has armed and continued to arm Saudi Arabia with American weaponry and defense systems with far more technologically superior equipment than anything the Iranian army or the IRGC has. After the JCPOA, Obama sold $90billion worth of arms to the Gulf, with the bulk going to Saudi, an extension of Trump’s $110billion deal to Saudi Arabia in 2017.[11] The US has military bases in Saudi Arabia used as a counterforce to Iran and deterrence to Iranian aggression. The US has continuously deployed aircraft carriers in the Strait of Hormuz to deter malign Iranian activities. For example, the USS Nimitz was deployed in the strait in 2020 after Iran engaged in a spoiling campaign targeting oil tankers.[12]

Iranian curtailment of Saudi influence

Exporting its evolution around the world

Iran’s strategy was to export its revolution by working with Shiites such as Hezbollah, disenfranchised Sunnis such as Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and nonaligned countries such as Syria as an ‘axis of resistance against the West.’ One significant instance of Iran attempting to export its revolution directly is the Hajj pilgrim conflict in 1987. Iranian Shite pilgrims began using Hajj to spread the Iranian revolution to the Muslims visiting from all over the world to attend Hajj. Saudi authorities asked Iran not to use Hajj for political purposes; however, the Iranian pilgrims clashed with Saudi police where at least 400 people were killed, including more than 200 Iranians, which led to both countries cutting diplomatic ties till 1991.[13] Throughout the Arab spring, Iran used soft power and propaganda to support Shiite protests all over the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, encouraging Shiites to protest for their rights.

Created and garnered proxies and used them to achieve regional goals

Iran does not have the technological or military capabilities to compete with its rivals. Iran’s conventional military arsenal is primarily made up of equipment that dates back to the 1970s before the fall of the Shah. Therefore, Iran significantly relies on asymmetric warfare through its support of proxies to bridge the military gap and spread its influence all over the Middle East. Iran heavily relies on this strategy as it has proxies throughout the Middle East. In Lebanon, it supports Hezbollah; in Palestine, it supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad; in Iraq,  it supports the PMF and other militias; in Yemen, it supports the Houthis; in Bahrain, it supports the al-Ashtar Brigade and many others.

In Lebanon, Iran helped form and train Hezbollah to counter the Israeli invasion and occupation of 1982. Hezbollah has been a critical ally of Iran and its closest and most reliable proxy as Iran pays Hezbollah $700 million a year.[14] Hezbollah has continuously undermined the Gulf-backed Lebanese State (until recently), essentially creating a state within a state. It also conducts large drug smuggling operations to Saudi and other Gulf states.[15]

Mohammad Bin Salman

            Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, was a disruptor to the Saudi-Iranian competition as he shifted the ideological basis of the battle from a religious/sectarian-based (Sunni vs. Shiite) to a nationalistic one (Saudi vs. Iran) and (Arabs vs. Persians). When he first rose to power, MBS focused on centralizing and monopolizing power in Saudi Arabia, traditionally shared between the royals, creating instability and discourse within the royal family.[16] MBS viewed Iran as the best tool to justify the centralization of power, emphasizing the risk Iran poses over the region and that he is the only one that can solve this problem. Additionally, MBS wanted to reform society and shift away from a religious Wahhabi ideology. Therefore, nationalism was seen as the natural successor, and that nationalism can be emphasized and accelerated with an Iranian threat.[17]  There are many other benefits to why MBS would target Iran, such as curtailing Iran’s hegemonic pursuit, maintaining Saudi economic supremacy in the region, and maintaining the US-Saudi relationship (which faced many challenges when the US signed the JCPOA with Iran.)

            The shift in ideology explains the period of escalation between the Gulf countries, the US, and Iran from 2017 to 2020. With the election of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate reformist, many assumed that it would be a period of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran; however, due to Saudi Arabia’s ideological shift, it compelled it to escalate tensions with Iran to move away from a religious to a more nationalistic ideology domestically. The shift in ideology was even seen in Saudi’s foreign policy during Iraq’s Moqtada al-Sadr’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Moqtada al-Sadr is an influential Shiite cleric from Iraq who heads one of the biggest political parties in Iraq. After the meeting, al-Sadr announced that he would be taking a more non-sectarian stance, battling for Iraqi nationalism.[18] He also announced that the Saudi consulate in the Shiite holy city of Najaf would be reopened, and he ordered all his followers to tear down anti-Saudi posters.[19]

Where we are today

            Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have engaged in talks with Iran to discuss regional issues and potential rapprochement. Saudi Arabia had depended on the US to deal with Iran; however, the Biden administration has signaled apparent abandonment of the region, pulling out the patriot missiles defense systems to be redeployed in the east.[20] Additionally, many other military installations are being redeployed, and Biden had made it clear that his foreign policy is focused on countering Russia and China. Therefore, the regional powers in the Middle East recognized the need for dialogue with American abandonment, dealing with their problems head-on rather than relying on the US. The competition between the countries will be never-ending; however, the future looks hopeful as opening lines of dialogue can only decrease tension and offer a period of calm and de-escalation. 

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[1]Lesch, David W., and Mark L. Haas. The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies. Routledge, 2018.

[2] Fisher, Max. “How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East.” The New York Times, 10 Nov.               2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html

[3] Ibid.

[4] Aarabi, Kasra. “What Is Velayat-e Faqih?” Tony Blair Institute For Global Change, 20 Mar. 2019,                                  https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih

[5] Aarabi, Kasra. “What Is Velayat-e Faqih?” Tony Blair Institute For Global Change, 20 Mar. 2019,                                  https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih

[6] Long, David E. “Tawhid or Jihad: What Wahhabism is and is not.” The Middle East Institute, 1 Oct. 2009,                                       https://www.mei.edu/publications/tawhid-or-jihad-what-wahhabism-and-not

[7] Pandith, Farah. “Extremism is Riyadh’s top export.” Foreign Policy, 24 Mar. 2019,                                                                                     https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/24/farah-pandith-saudi-how-we-win-book/

[8] Fisher, Max. “How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East.” The New York Times, 10 Nov.              2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html

[9] Russel, Richard L. “Iraq’s chemical weapons legacy: what other might learn from Saddam.” Middle East Journal,                       Vol. 59 (2), Spring 2005, pp.187-208.

[10] Al Jazeera Staff. “Yemen’s Houthis attacks Saudi’s Abha airport, injuring civilians.” Al Jazeera, 2 Jul. 2019,                                   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/2/yemens-houthis-attack-saudis-abha-airport-injuring-civilians

Riedel, Bruce. “The $110 billion arms deal to Saudi Arabia is fake news.” Brookings, 5 June. 2017,                                              https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-110-billion-arms-deal-to-saudi-arabia-is-fake-                     news/

[12] AP News Staff. “US carrier transit Strait of Hormuz amid tensions with Iran.” AP News, 18 Sep. 2020,                                            https://bit.ly/3lNNG6Q

[13] Iran Primer Staff. “Timeline of Iran-Saudi Relations.” The Iranian Primer, 29 May. 2018,                                                                       https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/jan/06/timeline-iran-saudi-relations

[14] Karam, Joyce. “Iran pays Hezbollah $700 million a year, US official says.” The National, 6 June. 2018,                                            https://bit.ly/3oA6pVe

[15] Arab News Staff. “Saudi-bound Hezbollah narcotics haul seized in major drugs bust.” Arab News, 9 Sept. 2021,                        https://www.arabnews.com/node/1925466/saudi-arabia

[16] Diwan, Kristin S. “Saudi Arabia Reassigns Roles within a More Centralized Monarchy.” The Arab Gulf States                               Institute in Washington, 22 Jan. 2019, https://bit.ly/3dHqdQ1

[17] Alhussein, Eman. “Saudi First: How hyper-nationalism is transforming Saudi Arabia.” European Council on Foreign                                   Relations, 19 June. 2019, https://bit.ly/3rQC4Uv

[18] Nejad, Ali F. “The Iranian-Saudi Hegemonic Rivalry.” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, 25 Oct. 2017,                                  https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/iranian-saudi-hegemonic-rivalry

[19] Ibid.

[20] Associated Press. “U.S. pulls missile defenses in Saudi Arabia amid Yemen attacks.” Politico, 11 Sept. 2021,                               https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/11/missile-defense-saudi-arabia-511320

October 1, 2021: How is Ethiopia able to Maintain Its History of Tolerance and Acceptance While Other Nations with Similar Histories and Demographics Do Not?, by Andrew Strahan

Introduction

Ethiopia is one of the most interesting cases of religious tolerance and coexistence between religious groups. There are three main religious groups in Ethiopia and each group is coalesced around different legends that congeal support and offer a sort of “divine influence” mentality; meaning that each group believes it is destined to be there by their god’s will. In particular, the Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, governs in this manner. The groups, however, have a long history of working together and offering refuge and support for one another. They respect one another because of their mutual systems of faith, despite their differences.

Main Religious Groups

There are three groups that make up the overwhelming majority of religions in Ethiopia. There are the Orthodox Christians, the Muslims, and the Protestant Christians. The Orthodox are one of the strictest sects in the world. They are extremely conservative and devout. They are one of the only Orthodox countries that reside outside of Eastern Europe. The Muslims are the second largest group. In contrast to the Christians, their numbers have stayed relatively the same over time. They are largely tolerant and well immersed into society. The Protestant Christians are the fastest growing however, still the smallest group. They have found kinship within the government of Abiy Ahmed and have used that relationship to advance their ministry.

Legends/Lore of the Groups

Muslims: It is believed that the prophet Muhammad sent refugees to the horn of Africa. Depending on who you ask, the exact location is either Sudan or Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Muslims strongly argue for the latter. The refugees were followers of Muhammad and were fleeing the governing tribe of Mecca sometime in the 6th/7th century. They were fleeing due to the persecution of Muhammad’s followers. The King, Negus, took them in and protected them from the tribe. This idea pushes the theory that Ethiopia is a land of acceptance and renewal. In addition, Harar, the Ethiopian Holy Muslim City, is actually the 4th most holy place in all Islam. It’s known in Africa as “Africa’s Mecca.”

Orthodox Christians: According to legend, the Ark of the Covenant (which is home to the ten commandments, given by God to Moses) is actually under guard in Aksum, a city in northern Ethiopia. The ark is believed by Christians to have been brought to Aksum by Menelik, the son of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon of Israel. This was after Jerusalem was sacked and Solomon’s temple destroyed in 586/587 BCE. It has since been guarded by a succession of monks who are forbidden until death to leave the church grounds. Aksum is a holy city of sorts to the Orthodox.

Protestant Christians: The Protestants believe that Martin Luther actually built the Protestant Reformation from the shoulders of the Christian Ethiopian Church. It is believed that he took inspiration from, what he considered, to be the first, true Christian Church. He thought that Ethiopia represented a nation where non-Europeans could engage in faith, without fear. He saw the nation as an example. Reports do show that Luther did meet with Ethiopian clerics but not necessarily that the meetings resulted into what we now know as the Reformation.

Conflicts

The three groups do not have a history of intense conflict with one another. Rather, they have conflict within their own sects and they have conflicts with small, independent groups. 

Muslims: Extremist Islamic groups are trying to gain influence. The leaders align more closely with moderate forces. This has begun to create a loss of legitimacy in Muslim youth as they see their leaders take weak stances on big issues. The greatest threat comes from outlying nations such as Somalia and Eritrea that host strong terrorist groups. Despite a large Christian population and Protestant president, Muslims are not really marginalized. Recently, attacks on Mosques have stoked some intense backlash. In 2019, 4 attacks destroyed mosques in the Amhara region and included intense damage to Muslim-owned business. Abiy Ahmed came out strongly against these attacks and quickly rounded up the perpetrators saying that the attacks were, “attempts by extremists to break down our rich history of religious tolerance and coexistence”. Some reports argue that religion was a small factor in the attacks but almost everyone agrees it was more a dispute over ethnicity and territory. 

Protestants: The protestants have gained power rapidly over the past few years, largely attributed to the protestant Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. His own religious belief as well as the close knit cadre of advisors have quickly built up institutions that favor the protestant church. In effect, as the protestant church gets bigger, the orthodox church gets smaller.

Orthodox: The orthodox, on the other hand, still outnumber all other religions. They account for the second largest orthodox population within a state, second only to Russia. They are highly conservative, even more so than their counterparts in Eastern Europe. The Orthodox faith was once the national identity of Ethiopia. Conflict has arisen recently regarding the building of a mosque in the city of Aksum. Only about 10% of the people there are Muslim, 85% orthodox. Aksum is also the site of a controversy right now while Muslims push mosques to be built and the orthodox oppose them. 

Today

If Africa has been seen in the news recently, it has been more than likely a discussion of the crisis in Tigray. This crisis is ongoing, complicated, and no one knows exactly what’s going on. The humanitarian crisis in the Northeast, Tigray region, is not necessarily a conflict of religion. If anything, it shows the solidarity that different groups have. The president has invested a great deal to support the Amhara people who are mostly Orthodox despite his strong protestant background. In addition,  99% of Tigrayans are Orthodox Christians. His decisions addressing the conflict have been largely influenced by his faith but not discriminatory towards a religion. While it may be disappointing to not have a clear answer on this crisis, it is reassuring to know that religion isn’t always the reason for conflict.

September 3, 2021: White Christian Nationalism by Stephen DeBlasio

The threat from domestic violent extremists is currently on an upward trend. As reported by the FBI, over 1,000 Domestic Violent Extremism (DVE) investigations were performed each year from 2017 to 2019.[1] 2019 was documented as the most lethal year for far-right violence in the US since 1995.[2] Beginning in 2021, the FBI reported over 2,000 open DVE investigations.[3] In the shadow of the January 6^th attack on the US Capitol, an understanding of the individuals and groups that conducted the attack is necessary to formulate effective policy responses. One of the underlying ideologies on display during January 6^th was White Christian Nationalism.[4] The events of January 6^th also represent a larger threat to American Democracy, the rise of illiberalism, and an authoritarian electorate willing to compromise the US Constitution if it means holding on to political power and advancing their legislative agenda.[5] In the following paragraphs, I will identify the historical context and intersectionality of White Christian Nationalists and established neo-conservative political factions.

To define nationalism, I use Bonikowski and DiMaggio’s adopted definition that “…nationalism is not an elite ideology or a specific set of normative beliefs, but a domain: “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’- oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life.’”[6] In this context, White Christian Nationalism (WCN) is a movement focused on a cultural and political change away from the tradition of civil religion, which represents universalism, liberalism, and equality for all, towards a system centered on white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity.[7] WCNs also qualify their members with the word “Christian,” coded to mean “white,” “native-born,” and “male.”[8] Amongst WCNs, there is a fundamental belief that the US was founded as a Christian nation, that the US has strayed away from those foundational principles, and that it is their divinely ordained mission to return the US to those founding, Christian, principles.[9]

White Christian Nationalism did not appear overnight. America’s first formal nationalist political party was the Know-Nothing Party, created in the 1840s by Protestant Christians primarily in Northeast cities such as Boston, Salem, New York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.[10] The Know-Nothing Party’s candidates ran on anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant platforms, with high-profile gubernatorial, congressional, and state legislature success.[11] However, the Know-Nothing Party was unable to maintain its success, and the party died out by the late 1850s with America’s focus shifting towards the Civil War and fight over slavery.[12]

Following the Know-Nothing Party’s demise, Christian nationalism faced several waves of success and subsequent decline in the 1920s over the fights for school prayer, mandatory bible reading, and anti-evolution fervor. However, two World Wars and the Great Depression prevented nationalist parties from gaining traction within America’s political system. Then came the 1960s and 1970s, with a wave of federal legislature and Supreme Court rulings that reignited the nationalist flame.[13] Notable legislation included the Civil Rights Act of 1965 and the Hart-Cellar Act granting the largest number of non-Western immigrants’ entry into the US. Meanwhile, significant Supreme Court decisions included removing mandatory bible reading and school prayer from schools, legalizing abortion from Roe v. Wade, and eliminating tax exemptions for organizations that discriminate based on race.[14] The result of the federal legislation and Supreme Court led to the creation of Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority movement. Researchers attribute the beginning of modern White Christian Nationalism to Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority movement in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.

However, unlike previous nationalist movements in the US, the Moral Majority’s constituency was invigorated by political strategists within the Republican Party to support Ronald Regan’s candidacy and presidency. By allying with the formal Republican Party, Christian nationalists could access an entire universe of professional, well-organized, and well-funded networks. Since the 1970s, Christian nationalists in the US have grown to include law firms, Political Action Committees, not-for-profit organizations, and a robust media network that provide followers with broadcast radio, news organizations, print media, and most recently, social media apps and channels. The fusion of Christian nationalists with neo-conservatives led to the formation of the New Right, which has remained the backbone of the Republican party.[15]

The Moral Majority and the Republican Party’s ability to fuse the white, protestant Christian voter block was further encouraged by the events of Ruby Ridge in 1992 and Waco in 1993. These two events traumatized militia and fundamental Christian groups, turning the perception of the federal government into an overbearing monster that is a direct threat to the safety and well-being of these groups.[16] One of the outcomes of Ruby Ridge and Waco was the domestic terror attack committed by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City. McVeigh’s terror attack in 1995 not only marked the deadliest domestic terror attack in the US but also represented a fundamental shift in domestic extremist groups, which saw an opportunity in incorporating Christian symbolism into group ideology as a recruitment tool, and later, as justification for violence.[17]

The early 1990s to the early 2000s also saw the rise of Pat Buchanan’s America First agenda and his nationalist Presidential campaigns. Pat Buchanan ran on an anti-globalist, anti-immigrant, pro-family values platform that resonated with a small portion of the US electorate.[18] However, Mr. Buchanan’s platform later transitioned into the Tea Party’s successful rise within the Republican Party in the late 2000s and early 2010s and the Make America Great Again campaign that President Trump successfully ran on.[19]

            The broad political network WCNs have developed in association with the New Right since the 1980s, and the political success from the 2010s has fueled a solid voter base that is uninterested in democratic values and the tradition of civil religion. Today, 36% of Republican voters qualify as Christian Nationalists based on ideology and political belief.[20] Instead, democratic backsliding is occurring at a steady pace in the US. In the last eight elections, from 1992-2020, the Republican Party only won the election by popular vote once, in 2004. Along with the lack of popular support, the Republican Party has shifted in ideology with the help of the New Right and politicians tailoring their agendas towards WCNs. Likewise, polling of the American populace in 1995 found that 25% of American’s believe it was a good idea to have “a strong leader who does not have to bother with the parliament and elections.”[21] That number increased to 38% in 2017.[22] Last, following the January 6^th insurrection, polling of Republican voters reveals 45% approved of the actions taken by the insurrectionist, with only 25% considering the insurrection a threat to democracy.[23]

The linkage between the coalition of WCNs, the New Right, and domestic violent extremist groups, and the increasing threat to US democracy from authoritarianism and democratic backsliding is apparent. The hope is that by identifying the historical context and intersectionality of WCNs and established neo-conservative political factions, policymakers can create effective deradicalization programs and return to the ideals that support the US initiative of achieving the higher ideas of the “city on the hill.”

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[1] Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “From 9/11 to 1/6 The War on Terror Supercharged the Far Right,” Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/war-on-terror-911-jan6.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Thomas B. Edsall, “’The Capitol Insurrection Was as Christian Nationalist as It Gets.’,” The New York Times (The New York Times, January 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/28/opinion/christian-nationalists-capitol-attack.html.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Bart Bonikowski and Paul DiMaggio, “Varieties of American Popular Nationalism,” American Sociological Review 81, no. 5 (September 8, 2016): pp. 949-980, https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416663683, 952.

[7]  Samuel L. Perry, Andrew L. Whitehead, and Joshua T. Davis, “God’s Country in Black and Blue: How Christian Nationalism Shapes Americans’ Views about Police (Mis)Treatment of Blacks,” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 5, no. 1 (August 2, 2018): pp. 130-146, https://doi.org/10.1177/2332649218790983, 132.

[8] Ibid. 132

[9] Gillian Hart, “Alternatives: Decoding ‘The Base’: White Evangelicals or Christian Nationalists?,” Studies in Political Economy 102, no. 1 (June 2, 2021): pp. 61-76, https://doi.org/10.1080/07078552.2021.1901015, 63.

[10] Josh Zeitz, “When America Hated Catholics,” POLITICO Magazine, September 23, 2015, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/when-america-hated-catholics-213177/.

[11] Arie Perliger, American Zealots: Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2020), 32.

[12] Ibid. 33

[13] Jeffrey Haynes, Trump and the Politics of Neo-Nationalism: The Christian Right and Secular Nationalism in America (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2021), 44.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid, 45.

[16] Samuel Perry, “The Capitol Siege Recalls Past Acts of Christian Nationalist Violence,” The Conversation, September 1, 2021, https://theconversation.com/the-capitol-siege-recalls-past-acts-of-christian-nationalist-violence-153059.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Jeffrey Haynes, Trump and the Politics of Neo-Nationalism: The Christian Right and Secular Nationalism in America (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2021), 48.

[19] Ibid. 54

[20] Thomas B. Edsall, “’The Capitol Insurrection Was as Christian Nationalist as It Gets.’,” The New York Times (The New York Times, January 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/28/opinion/christian-nationalists-capitol-attack.html.

[21] Pippa Norris, “It Happened in America,” Foreign Affairs, January 26, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-07/it-happened-america.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Linley Sanders, Matthew Smith, and Jamie Ballard, “Most Voters Say the Events at the US Capitol Are a Threat to Democracy,” YouGov, January 7, 2021, https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/01/06/US-capitol-trump-poll.

August 6, 2021: The Impact of Islamic Revolution on Women’s Right in Iran by Niki Azizi

In 1931, during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925-1941) in Iran, a family law was instituted that had wide ramifications concerning women’s right to marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. This law was incorporated into Iran’s ostensibly secular civil code. This supposed “secularity” of the civil code needs to be qualified, however. Reza Shah indeed attempted a reform project that included secularizing the Iranian state. This included certain symbolic regulations concerning women, such as forced unveiling, which was believed to help modernize Iranian society. Nonetheless, in designing the new civil code and the new family law, Shi’ite clerics were included in the commission tasked with reviewing the proposed laws and were charged with ensuring their compatibility with Islamic law (shari’a). This resulted in a collection of laws that were influenced by highly traditionalist reading/interpretation of Islamic law. Therefore, it is safe to say that while the legal system was secular in form, its content was informed by prevalent religious attitudes and beliefs, and this was especially true with regard to family law in general and women’s rights in particular.

During the early reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, (1941-1963), he attempted to provide a platform for women and make some changes in the family law that would not lose him the support of Iran’s clerical establishment (‘ulama) that had gained a great deal of social and political power in that time.  Later women’s rights activists had a more significant political influence, including in the White Revolution, and therefore had more chances to promote women’s legal status. Between 1963 and1975, a great deal of changes were made to the family law regarding women’s rights, which were enacted under a project entitled the Family Protection Law (FPL). This project attempted to reform the status of Iranian women’s legal rights and to move the law toward greater equality. The reforms enacted by this project included new restrictions on polygymy, women could initiate divorce, run for office, inherit property. Importantly, this law also enabled women to gain custody of their children following a divorce upon court’s approval, which under the Islamic law, the custody of the children had primarily been a privilege of the father. This law also raised the legal age of marriage to 18. However, since the law was just established and that combined with the lack of awareness about these policies, while this reform practically changed women status from the higher class of the society, women from middle class or lower class were still not affected by these changes. 

Also, immediately prior to the 1979 revolution, many Shi’ite clerics including the Ayatollah Khomeini raised concerns regarding the Family Protection Law and labeled it as a Westernized reform project that would ultimately destroy family values and respect for women in Iranian society. Women and their rights therefore became one of the main foundations of criticizing the Pahlavi dynasty, and a main drive for the Islamic revolution. It is noteworthy to mention that many liberals joined the anti-monarchist movement and supported Khomeini out of a common desire to oppose the Pahlavi shah and build a new political system. Even women who did not have strict Islamic beliefs or did not believe in instituting an Islamic state used the full-length Islamic covering (chador) as a symbol of their opposition and would wear it in various protests, in the hope that when they overthrew the monarchy their idea will be realized by Khomeini. However, in the years following the revolution, from 1980-1983, the new Islamic Republic started to suppress and eliminate the other parties, which were considered contrary to the ‘Islamic’ character of the revolution, which was based in a conservative religious understanding of Iranian culture. Regarding women’s rights, one of the first steps of the revolutionary government in 1980 was to annul the Family Protection Law, and to redefine women’s family status and duties in the new constitution. Therefore, despite some advancements for women in some areas, such as greater access to education and healthcare after the revolution, according to the new family law women were generally deprived of many of their basic rights. For example, the new laws granted the following: polygamy for men, child marriage,[1] the father or guardian’s control of the first marriage, default of custody in favor of the father or the father’s family and granting the right to divorce for men but not women. Women could no longer serve as judges and were dismissed or hounded out from many governmental and professional positions due to their gender. By law, husbands retain primary control over domestic affairs. Across the country, particularly in its more remote and impoverished areas, many women struggled and continue to struggle with normalized patterns of coercion, physical violence, and marital rape, which is currently not a recognized crime in Iranian law. Additionally, the Iranian government engages in repression of any NGOs or activists who voice concerns about such discrimination or attempt reforms.

When questioned by the international community, the Islamic Republic continues to justify these discriminatory policies with reference to national values and its official interpretation of shari’a. While women’s rights activists have been successful in raising public awareness and making minimal reforms in the family law by offering a new interpretation of shari’a, they have nonetheless been unable to make drastic changes in women’s legal status. It should be noted, however, that women’s legal status does not necessarily determine their social status or the popular attitudes toward gender. In recent decades, activists have sought to voice their concerns via peaceful protests against state repression but have faced an apparent escalation in official surveillance and intimidation. The most recent demands of women involve putting an end to compulsory hijab. The campaign against forced veiling has, however, resulted in physical attacks, detention, and prosecution, with some high-profile activists and lawyers being handed lengthy prison sentences.

I believe the reason for this much resistance of the government toward reforming women’s rights especially regarding compulsory hijab is not mainly religious, because if we review the religious content the hijab was primarily related to modesty and morality. During and after the revolution, however, the hijab transformed into a religio-political issue and emerged as a symbol of power of Islamic Republic. Consequently, the government is primarily concerned that reforming women’s rights, including making hijab optional for women, will mean that they lost the core reason of existence and ultimately might degrade their legitimacy even further. 

References:

“How Iran’s Women Are Using Their Hijabs to Fight the Regime.” Accessed August 13, 2021. https://nypost.com/2020/02/01/how-irans-women-are-using-their-hijabs-to-fight-the-regime/.

Kar, Mehrangiz, and Golriz Farshi. “Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 15, no. 1 (2008): 75–86.

Keddie, Nikki R. “Women in Iran Since 1979.” Social Research 67, no. 2 (2000): 405.

Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. “The Conservative–Reformist Conflict Over Women’s Rights in Iran.” International Journal of Politics, 2002, 17.

“Nasrin Sotoudeh: Iran Lawyer Who Defended Headscarf Protesters Jailed.” BBC News, March 11, 2019, sec. Middle East. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47531312.

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[1] Eventually the minimum age for brides would be set at nine years old.

July 2, 2021: Evangelicals and US Foreign Policy by Dikshita Venkatesh

Faith and religious beliefs have been extremely influential in guiding political decisions and foreign policy considerations. Since the late 1900s, US foreign policy in the Middle East has been deeply rooted in Evangelical ideals. To understand the extent of influence, it is important to delve into who evangelicals are and how they are different from mainline protestants.

The term evangelical takes its roots from the Greek word euangelion which refers to the ‘good news’ or ‘gospel’. This ‘good news’ or ‘gospel’ deals with the idea of Jesus Christ being the savior of humanity.[i] Thus, a person or an organization that believes and furthers this ‘gospel’ is an evangelical.

Further clarity on this community was provided by David Bebbington in 1989, through his Bebbington Quadrilateral[ii], which defined evangelicals based on their beliefs. According to the Quadrilateral, there are four beliefs that are central to evangelicalism:

• Biblicism: Obedience to the Bible and believing that it is inerrant in terms of how it portrays the nature of God and the world.
• Crucicentrism: The belief that following Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation of humanity.
• Conversionism: The belief that redemption can only occur by converting to Christianity or following Jesus Christ.
• Activism: The belief that one’s faith or the ‘gospel’ should reflect in one’s public life through social reform efforts.

This Quadrilateral has been useful in distinguishing evangelicals from mainline Protestants. Mainline Protestants have a more modern and adaptable faith.[iii] First, they don’t see the Bible as an inerrant word of God, rather as a document that contains various important truths which are subject to interpretation. Second, while they agree with the fact that Christ is the way to salvation, they are more tolerant to the idea that there may be other ways to redemption— based on one’s faith and religious practices. This belief further portrays that they do not consider conversion to Christianity to be very important. Lastly, they believe in furthering their faith, and not the ‘gospel’ per se.

Based on these beliefs, there are three areas of foreign policy that are of most importance to evangelicals— Israel, humanitarian assistance and religious freedom— out of which, Israel was identified as the most significant concerns for evangelicals.

This is because evangelicals consider Israel as a significant part of the Christian messianic tradition. That is, they consider the return of Jews to Palestine “as the first step in the advancement of the messianic timetable” or Christ’s second coming.[iv] Furthermore, they believe that the US has a “special role and mission in God’s plans for humanity: that of a modern Cyrus, to help restore Jews to Zion.”[v] Thus, a combination of both these beliefs forms the bedrock of evangelical support to Israel and contextualizes the long-standing relationship between the US and Israel. Over the course of this relationship, Israel has been the largest recipient of US foreign aid.[vi] It has received more funds than “Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan combined, more than the counter-insurgency efforts in Vietnam and more than all of Europe under the Marshall Plan.”[vii]

Furthermore, Israel has enjoyed sustained prioritization in American foreign policy, irrespective of the administration in power.[viii] For instance, during the 2012 Presidential Election Campaigns, Mitt Romney made it a point to visit Israel between his trips to the UK and Poland, instead of visiting rising powers like India and China. Subsequently, John Kerry—as the US Secretary of State—chose to focus on rekindling talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, when there were other pressing matters such civil war in Syria, the war in Afghanistan, the rise of China, to name a few.

Lastly, humanitarian assistance and efforts to initiate religious freedom form part of ‘activism’, discussed above. However, these activities are being used to further evangelical domestic goals such as abortion. For instance, the Global Gag Rule prevents foreign NGOs, receiving US aid, from discussing abortions with constituents.[ix]

Thus, the domestic and geopolitical aims of evangelicals has been impacting US foreign policy considerations in a very conspicuous manner.

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[i] Green, John. “Evangelicals – Evangelicals V. Mainline Protestants | The Jesus Factor | FRONTLINE.” PBS. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jesus/evangelicals/evmain.html.

[ii] “What Is an Evangelical?” National Association of Evangelicals. Accessed July 30, 2021. https://www.nae.net/what-is-an-evangelical/.

[iii] Green, John. “Evangelicals – Evangelicals V. Mainline Protestants | The Jesus Factor | FRONTLINE.” PBS. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jesus/evangelicals/evmain.html.

[iv] Ariel, Yaakov. “Messianic Hopes and Middle East Politics: The Influence of Millennial Faith on American Middle East Policies.” VOL. IX – N°1 | 2011 Religion and Politics in the English-speaking World: Historical and Contemporary Links. https://journals.openedition.org/lisa/4165?lang=en.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Hubbard, Kaia. “3 Charts That Illustrate Where U.S. Foreign Aid Goes.” U.S. News. March 24, 2021. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2021-05-24/afghanistan-israel-largest-recipients-of-us-foreign-aid.

[vii] Miller, Paul D. “Evangelicals, Israel and US Foreign Policy.” Survival 56, no. 1 (2014): 7-26. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2014.882149.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Redden, Molly. “‘Global Gag Rule’ Reinstated by Trump, Curbing NGO Abortion Services Abroad.” The Guardian. January 23, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/trump-abortion-gag-rule-international-ngo-funding.

June 4, 2021: The Rise of Hindu Nationalism, Islamophobia and Foreign Policy by Max Mellott

US-India relations have been on a steady upward trajectory for the last several decades, accelerating over the last five years in the face of a rising China. A curious episode during Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s December 2019 visit to Washington, however, reveals some of the ways that the BJP’s commitment to the project of Hindu nationalism constrain its foreign policy. Jaishankar refused to meet with Representative Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), citing her support for a resolution calling on India to respect freedom of expression in Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir and her history of statements calling for India to improve the state of human rights and religious freedom in the country.

The refusal to meet Jayapal, a key member of the majority party and one of the few Indian-American members of Congress had real consequences. House Foreign Affairs Committee chair Elliot Engel (D-NY) cancelled the committee’s meeting with Jaishankar, and it resulted in a flurry of news reports and op-eds drawing attention to India’s human rights short-comings and question the trajectory of the US-India relationship. While Jaishankar is generally considered a pragmatic, technocratic member of the Modi government, his very public stand defending the BJP government’s moves to crush dissent in Muslim-majority Kashmir reflects the centrality of Islamophobia or the ‘othering’ of Islam to the BJP’s theory of national unity and governance, which cannot be cast aside to meet its foreign policy goals.

Since the birth of a nationalist independence movement, figuring out what defines and unites Indians has been an often surprisingly difficult question to answer. Historian Ramachandra Guha identified five main axes of conflict in post-independence India: caste, language, religion, class and gender, and any ideology that seeks to govern across India needs to find a way to bridge, or at least manage, these divisions. For Hindu nationalists, looking to build a single pan-Indian Hindu identity to manage these conflicts and hold political power, Islamophobia has been central to their rise to national political power.

Othering Islam became so central because the creation of a single, unifying, Hindu identity was not something that was as obvious as it might seem and was a potentially alienating concept even for presumptive members of the Hindu nation, never mind Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Buddhists, followers of Adivasi religions, or indeed, Muslims. Among Hindus, for the hundreds of millions of low-caste or casteless people, a Hindu nation threatened to reinforce their subjugation, reversing decades of economic and political gains. For women, a Hindu nation similarly threatened to reverse growing legal, economic, and political power. Across linguistic lines, the close association of orthodox Hinduism with the Sanskrit literary cannon and modern spoken Hindi similarly threatened the status of languages like Tamil or Telugu. Furthermore, these separate axes of identity (caste, language) themselves proved to be powerful mobilizers of political support. As a result, Hindu nationalism spent decades after independence as a relatively marginalized, if internally well organized, political force.

Islamophobia, along with Hindu-themed mass media and the collapse of the Congress party’s organization, was one of the key ingredients for Hindu nationalism’s rise from the margins to the center of national power. The key event marking Hindu nationalism’s arrival as a national political force was the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, an incident of mob violence inspired, incited, and very likely directed by the institutions of the Sangh Parivar, the incarnation of institutional Hindu nationalism. The Hindu nationalist narrative emphasized Hindu suffering at the hands of foreign Muslim invaders for eight hundred years from the Ghaznavids to the Mughals, represented by the Babri Masjid, and promised that India could be returned to a supposed pre-Islamic Hindu golden age, represented by the temple to Ram to be erected in its place.

The engineered mob violence at Ayodhya presaged a rise to power for the Hindu nationalists that has consistently returned to rhetorical, legal and at times physical assaults on Muslims and other religious minorities and their membership in the Indian national community. These assaults have ranged from accusations of spreading coronavirus or using marriage to force Hindus to convert in a ‘love jihad,’ to threats to deport Muslim migrants and the revocation of the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim majority state, to deadly proliferation of ‘cow protection’ vigilantism and periodic episodes of mass violence, such as the 2001 Gujarat riots or the 2020 Delhi riots. Even as some leaders of the BJP have emphasized a message of economic development over social tensions, Islamophobia and assaults on minorities have rarely been more then a wink and a nod away, ready to be trotted out whenever it seems to be politically advantageous, such as during the recent state elections in West Bengal and Assam.

For the BJP’s foreign policy, these domestic necessities have important implications. India’s relationship with its Western partners, who have institutional and legal commitments to religious freedom such as the US’s International Religious Freedom Act, are likely to be consistently troubled by periodic episodes of concern and disagreement. These episodes could be quite serious. In areas like technology development and regulation that are of primary strategic importance, concerns over the way that technology is deployed to suppress dissent or target minorities might limit the depth of cooperation. When India needs to request political favors through national legislatures, it may find that it has burned precious political capital.

Even if these episodes are unlikely to derail their broader strategic alignment, they do limit the depth of possible policy cooperation, particularly in areas less directly touched by geo-strategic concerns, like education, migration, or even economic and development policy. It also means that India is unlikely to fully come around to the Western way of thinking on human rights, pitting India’s government against large swaths of Western civil society. In the context of competition with China, where airing concerns over human rights, and in particular China’s treatment of its own Muslim minority groups has become a key flashpoint, it is not clear that India and its partners in the Quadrilateral security dialogue or in Europe can see eye-to-eye.

India also has key relationships with Muslim majority-countries to worry about. For example, India enjoys strong economic and security relationships with the Persian Gulf states, based on the flow of Indian migrant workers to the Gulf and energy resources and remittances back to India. India has also collaborated closely on issues ranging from space exploration to joint military exercises. Like with the West, the logic of these economic and strategic relationships might overwhelm any concerns over religious freedom, a flurry of criticism and public outrage over the riots in Delhi targeting Muslims in the Gulf points to the limits that the BJP’s othering of Muslims places on the depth of India’s relationships to the Gulf.

Still, Islamophobia and the targeting of minority rights are not always a loser abroad. Some relationships, like India’s close defense and trade relationship with Israel, are unlikely to be significantly shaken by concerns around Islamophobia and might even be deepened as a Hindu nationalist India makes common cause based on the supposed security threat posed by Muslims. In its immediate neighborhood in its relationship with Sri Lanka, long strained by tensions between the island’s Sinhala and Tamil populations and the Buddhist Sinhala chauvinism of Sri Lanka’s government, an attempt to limit the autonomy of Muslim minorities after the Easter Bombings of 2019 represents a rare moment of narrative convergence between the two states. In these cases, and potentially others, the deep-seated othering of Islam by Hindu nationalists might actually create common ground, rather then be a source of division.

Islamophobia has been at the center of the BJP’s rise to power and the Hindu nationalist project more generally. It has been one of the movement’s most important tools to attempt to overcome the obstacles of caste division, language status and even religious differences, by identifying Hinduism with a common narrative of subjugation at the hands of Muslims followed by the restoration of a ‘lost’ Hindu golden age. This narrative cannot be easily jettisoned, and it will continue to constrain India’s foreign relationships as long as Hindu nationalism is an ascendent political force. Only when other narratives and institutions are strengthened as ways to manage India’s internal conflict can it be overcome, a task that is likely to be slow and painstaking at best.