Tag: student events

Background

Hezbollah is a Shiite political and military organization rooted in Lebanon. The group was established during the early 1980s with support from Iran. Since then, it has expanded globally and engages in political, criminal, and terrorist operations across six continents, including South America. Its presence in South America began in the mid-1980s when a significant influx of immigrants from Lebanon and Syria arrived.^[1] In the past, the group carried out significant attacks against U.S. personnel and interests during the 1980s and 1990s, such as the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The U.S. designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 1997.^[2]

Hezbollah established its first major strongholds in Venezuela, Colombia, and the Tri-Border Area. The area is known for its relatively weak law enforcement, where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet. It has increased its activities over time through its grassroots support from diaspora communities. They are diverse, including Arabs, Christians, and Shia.^[3] Their support appears pivotal for the armed group. They provide Hezbollah legitimacy, resources and networks, establishing a significant presence in South America.^[4]

Hezbollah replicates its social welfare model in Lebanon to overseas diaspora. It aims to ensure influence and control across generations on the continent. Some supporters send remittances to Hezbollah, while many are involved in its illicit activities, acting as facilitators, financiers, or fixers.^[5] Hezbollah’s strength mostly lies in the second group. They are an informal and clan-based network of extended families in South American countries.^[6] They help the group’s illicit network become hardly detectable. Today, Hezbollah continues to be involved in drug and human trafficking, arms trading, smuggling of illicit cigarettes, trade-based money laundering, and financing terrorism through these clans.^[7]

Countering Hezbollah to Promote Security and Stability in South America

The Rada, Saleh, and Nassereddine clans are Hezbollah’s main actors in Venezuela and Colombia. The families share blood ties and seamlessly integrate into the region’s economic life. They exploit corruption and lax law enforcement in the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay and the Colon Free Trade Zone in Panama. They finance terrorism through drug and human trafficking, arms trading, illicit cigarette smuggling, and money laundering. They generate an estimated $300 million per year and funnel the money to Lebanese Hezbollah.^[8]

The U.S. approaches Hezbollah activities in South America as a transnational criminal organization, unlike its approach in the Middle East where Hezbollah is a designated terrorist entity. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions the families, specifically the Rada brothers, under E.O. 13224 in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration.^[9] Blocking access to the U.S. market appears to have limited impact on the organization’s network. The Rada brothers remain active in trade and finance. They are still able to travel freely, and they utilize the regime-controlled illicit economy in Venezuela to access financial resources.

To combat Hezbollah, the U.S. needs more than sanctions. The U.S. should emphasize diplomatic efforts, foster greater hemispheric cooperation, and build capacity to stop Hezbollah on all fronts.

Diplomatic efforts are important in persuading South American countries to recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Hezbollah is not classified as a terrorist organization in most South American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Peru. Local authorities are limited in their ability to monitor and prosecute the group and its operatives. Diplomatic initiatives can raise awareness among South American governments about the risks posed by Hezbollah’s presence. Awareness can enable local authorities to legally monitor, prosecute, and take action against Hezbollah’s operations.

Greater hemispheric cooperation will enhance anti-Hezbollah efforts. Diplomatic, defense, and law enforcement cooperation will lead to more effective action. Countries should pool resources, share intelligence, and synchronize activities. One country might have advanced surveillance technology, while another has specialized knowledge in counterterrorism tactics. Sharing these resources means that all countries can benefit without bearing the full cost alone. For instance, the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay formed the 3+1 Group for Tri-Border Security after the September 11 attacks. Their Tripartite Command integrates police intelligence agents from Ciudad del Este, Foz de Yguazú in Brazil, and Puerto Yguazú in Argentina. The cooperation has led to an increase in Hezbollah-related arrests for drug trafficking and money laundering.^[10]

Offering resources for capacity building will improve the counterterrorism and organized crime capabilities of South American governments. This effort should include strengthening security forces, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement. Over time, these resources can make these countries less reliant on external assistance.

There are concerns that a united front against Hezbollah can push the Venezuelan government to further deepen its relationships with Hezbollah leaders, Iran, and Russia. Yet building a regional coalition that includes a diverse group of countries can help mitigate Venezuela’s reliance on adversarial partnerships. By fostering a sense of mutual benefit, cooperation can encourage Venezuela to prioritize regional stability over contentious alliances. This strategy addresses the immediate threat posed by Hezbollah and contributes to a foundation for long-term stability and prosperity in South America.

Hezbollah’s influence extends into political, financial, and military spheres in South America.   U.S. sanctions alone will not address its threat. Diplomatic efforts, greater hemispheric cooperation, and capacity-building in the region offer the best way to stop Hezbollah. Such cooperation will neutralize the immediate threats posed by Hezbollah and lay the groundwork for a better future. South America will realize its full potential, free from the shadows of terrorism and crime. Such a world is not only better for South America but for the global community. It marks a significant step forward in our collective quest for a safer, more just world. 

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^[1] Hezbollah’s Record on War & Politics,” October 25, 2023, Wilson Center, p. 4-5

^[2] Robinson, Kali. “What Is Hezbollah?” Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified October 14, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah.

^[3] Realuyo, Celina. Interview by Seda GUNES. “Discussion on Hezbollah.” February 6, 2024.

^[4] “HEZBOLLAH IN LATIN AMERICA–IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives.

^[5] Realuyo, Celina. Interview by Seda GUNES.

^[6] Joseph M. Humire, “The Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime,” October 7, 2020, Atlantic Council. p. 3-4

^[7]  Ibid.

^[8]  Emanuele Ottolenghi. “U.S. Treasury Sanctions Latin America-Based Hezbollah Financial Network,” September 13, 2023, Flash Brief, Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

^[9] Treasury Designates Hizballah Operatives and Financial Facilitators in South America and Lebanon,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 12, 2023.

^[10] Realuyo, Celina B. “Rising Concerns about Hezbollah in Latin America Amid Middle East Conflict.” Blog post. December 1, 2023.

Executive Summary 
The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) promotes the hateful values of Russian nationalism. Zealous members perceive any opposition as a threat to their pure, Russian ethnicity. As a result, RIM holds antisemitic, anti-LGBT,  and anti-immigrant stances. Over the past decade, RIM has connected with other supremacist groups, such as the Nordic Resistance Movement, resulting in violent calls to action. Despite RIM’s terrorist organization designation from the United States, the group still remains a large risk because of their heavy online presence. Their social media use allows for their rhetoric and paramilitary training to spread globally.

Origins

RIM is the sinister brainchild of founder Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev. Created in 2002, Vorobyev sought to restore Russia back to its traditional, pre-1917 Tsarist roots of the Romanov dynasty^[1]. RIM was framed as a grassroots Orthodox Christian movement, attracting disenfranchised Russian men who were longing for a supremacist brotherhood. The organization was relatively unpopular since its inception; rather, RIM appealed mostly to fringe political groups. To gain traction, Vorobyev aligned RIM with other groups, such as the Russians Ethno-Political Association (REPA)^[2]. Afterwards, RIM’s ideology shifted from religious rhetoric and more towards “ethnic nationalism,” emphasizing Russian heritage, anti-immigrant, anti-semitic, and anti-LGBT platforms^[3]. By 2012, RIM made feeble efforts to form an opposition party to Vladimir Putin. Their attempts were unsuccessful^[4]. RIM went largely unnoticed by the public until their involvement with the 2014 annexation of Crimea. RIM’s paramilitary unit, “The Imperial Legion,” was born. 100 members went to Ukraine to aid separatists in combat and financially.^[5] RIM’s prolific training course, Partizan, was developed to militarize separatists^[6]. Partizan continued to expand and currently offers multiple online combat classes offered to the public.

Allyships

RIM’s aid in the 2014 Crimea invasion formed a reluctant friendship with the Russian government. From RIM’s perspective, Putin’s administration was not traditional enough and it did not support pure Russian ethnicity. Putin viewed RIM as a thorn in his side. However, RIM is quietly tolerated so long as they act in support with Russia’s foreign conflicts^[7]. After Putin’s silent nod of approval, RIM gained notoriety with adjacent hate groups. The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), a neonazi group originating in Scandinavia, forged close ties with Vorobyev. The two groups have met frequently to share ideologies. Common themes include: the degradation of Western civilization caused by Jews, taking down the “Jewish Oligarchs” in Ukraine, and the evil “Jewish cabal” that spreads globalization^[8]. Words precede actions, and in 2016, two members of NRM were trained in RIM’s Partizan training camp. After learning about explosives at Partizan, the two NRM members bombed refugee centers in Sweden^[9]

Since increasing popularity in Europe, Vorobyev sought to expand RIM’s horizons. In 2017, members of RIM conducted a business trip to the U.S. to meet with Matthew Heinbach, the leader of American supremacist group, the Traditionalist Workers Party (TWP). After the prophetic reunion,  Heinbach later gushed that “their goals and our goals are very similar” and he intends for TWP to “kind of be the representative of America at the future gatherings of [RIM]”^[10]. Continued expansion and global connections raises the risk of a joint supremacist task force, exchanging paramilitary training and propaganda^[11]. In efforts to prevent American involvement in RIM’s global indoctrination campaign, the Trump administration in 2020 designated RIM an official terrorist organization^[12]. Along with the designation, the US also financially sanctioned Vorobyev, and prominent members Denis Valliullovich Gariev, and Nikolay Nikolayevich Truschalov^[13]. Additionally, anyone acting alongside RIM may be given criminal penalties^[14].

Social Media Movement

Due to the wide reaching scope of the internet, RIM relies on social media for recruitment and continued education. Preliminary data scraping for RIM digital content yielded a RIM designated Telegram channel, Partizan specific Telegram channel, a Partizan Vkontakte account, a RIM Vkontakte account, a RIM independent website, and an independent Partizan website. RIM’s main Telegram channel has 3,199 subscribers, Partizan’s Telegram account has 4, 820 subscribers, while Partizan’s Vkontakte has 53,949 followers, and RIM’s Vkontakte account has 21,236 followers  (n= 83,205). All four accounts generate similar content in conjunction with Partizan’s website, proving close coordination between the platforms. Common messaging included posts denigrating the global Jewish population and non- Orthodox Christian demographics (see figure 1). Additionally, RIM’s telegram advertised group propaganda meetings with contact emails available (see figure 2). Partizan’s content consisted of military-style courses to be implemented in RIM operations, such as Kalashnikov and close combat training, while their independent website has course sign-ups and reviews (see figure 3). RIM’s Vkontakte account parrots the same posts on their Telegram; however, their independent website has sign-up forms and blog posts.

                                                            Bibliography

Casey Michel. “Russian, American White Nationalists Raise Their Flags in Washington,” September 22, 2017. https://archive.thinkprogress.org/russian-american-nationalists-washington-5bd15fd18eaf/.

Counter Extremism Project. “Russian Imperial Movement (RIM).” Accessed February 1, 2024. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/russian-imperial-movement-rim.

“Dangerous Organizations and Bad Actors: Nordic Resistance Movement | Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey,” November 18, 2022. https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/academics/centers-initiatives/ctec/ctec-publications/dangerous-organizations-and-bad-actors-nordic.

Mapping Militant Organizations. “Russian Imperial Movement.” Stanford University. Last modified February 2021. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles /russian-imperial-movement

Savage, Charlie, Adam Goldman, and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Will Give Terrorist Label to White Supremacist Group for First Time.” The New York Times, April 6, 2020, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/terrorist-label-white-supremacy-Russian-Imperial-Movement.html.

The Soufan Center. “IntelBrief: Russian Imperial Movement Labeled a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity,” April 7, 2020. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-russian-imperial-movement-labeled-a-specially-designated-global-terrorist-entity/

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^[1] “Russian Imperial Movement (RIM),” Counter Extremism Project, accessed February 1, 2024, https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/russian-imperial-movement-rim.

^[2] Mapping Militant Organizations, “Russian Imperial Movement,” Stanford University, last modified February 2021, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles /russian-imperial-movement

^[3] Stanford University,  “MMP: Russian Imperial Movement,

^[4] Stanford University.

^[5] Counter Extremism Project, “Russian Imperial Movement (RIM).”

^[6] “Russian Imperial Movement (RIM).”

^[7] Stanford University.

^[8] “Dangerous Organizations and Bad Actors: Nordic Resistance Movement,” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey,November 18, 2022, https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/academics/centers-initiatives/ctec/ctec-publications/dangerous-organizations-and-bad-actors-nordic.

^[9] “Dangerous Organizations and Bad Actors: Nordic Resistance Movement.”

^[10] Casey Michel, “Russian, American White Nationalists Raise Their Flags in Washington,” September 22, 2017, https://archive.thinkprogress.org/russian-american-nationalists-washington-5bd15fd18eaf/.

^[11] Casey Michel, “Russian, American White Nationalists Raise Their Flags in Washington.”

^[12] Charlie Savage, Adam Goldman, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Will Give Terrorist Label to White Supremacist Group for First Time,” The New York Times, April 6, 2020, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/terrorist-label-white-supremacy-Russian-Imperial-Movement.html.

^[13] “IntelBrief: Russian Imperial Movement Labeled a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity,” The Soufan Center (blog), April 7, 2020, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-russian-imperial-movement-labeled-a-specially-designated-global-terrorist-entity/.

^[14] “IntelBrief:Russian Imperial Movement Labeled a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity.”

January 7, 2022: Religion and the Use of Force in World Politics by Witt Caldwell

Does religion play a role in whether a third party intervenes in another state’s civil war? Conventional wisdom suggests that it does. When fighting broke out between Maronite Christian and Druze communities in the Levant during the early 1860s, France intervened on the side of the Christians, sending thousands of troops to put a stop to the fighting. Forty years earlier, Russia sent troops to fight in Greece’s war for independence against the Ottoman Empire. Viewing itself as an ardent defender of Orthodox Christians living under Ottoman rule, Russia sought to prevent further atrocities committed against Christians during the war, which included selling Greek women into slavery and hanging clergy. Appalled by the atrocities and compelled to stick up for their fellow Christians oppressed by Muslim ‘infidels,’ Britain and France also sent troops to wrest Greek independence from the Ottomans. Each of these cases show third parties basing their decision to intervene on religious grounds.

Then again, were these interventions motivated by factors other than religion? Russia could have intervened in Greece to gain influence in the Ottoman Empire’s backyard. France may not have been interested in protecting Maronite Christian communities in Syria, but rather expanding its influence in the Middle East—after all, Syria eventually became a French colony following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

These cases highlight a puzzle in the conflict literature: why are some third-party interventions motivated by religion, but not others? This puzzle also raises the question of whether religion even plays a role in third-party interventions. Indeed, religion may serve as a guise for state interests when they intervene in another state’s civil war. However, the argument that religion has a hand in third-party interventions is compelling.

For example, consider Syria’s intervention during the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). When Lebanon was founded in 1943, its leaders agreed to ratify the National Pact, which set up a confessional system where the state’s myriad religious communities were represented in Lebanon’s government. Over time, the Pact was not able to keep up with demographic changes. In the years leading up to the conflict, there were many more Muslims living in Lebanon than Christians, yet Christians had far more influence in the Lebanese government. With the Lebanese government struggling to maintain control, the conflict began in 1975 between various religious factions. The war had several phases, marked by numerous mediation attempts and third-party interventions, and claiming approximately 170,000 lives.

Syria intervened in the early stages of the conflict. At face value, Syria’s decision to intervene seems to stem from power politics, not religion. The civil war added to a long list of events that made for a tumultuous period in the Arab world. Israel’s founding after World War II still stirred controversy and acrimony across the Middle East. A coalition of Arab states, including Syria, spearheaded an unsuccessful war effort against Israel. With the Cold War in full swing, Washington and Moscow’s influence hung over the region. 

Before its intervention, there were early indications that Syria would intervene on the side of the Muslim Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), the military wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Damascus deployed Syrian-aligned militias to Lebanon, serving as a stronger indication of a Syrian intervention. The PLA’s forces, along with the forces of other Muslim factions, dwarfed the Christian factions. If the PLA and other Muslim groups decided to stage an attack on the Christians, the Muslim forces would overrun the Christians, delivering a victory to the PLO in Lebanon. 

However, as the conflict unraveled, Damascus realized that a PLO victory may not benefit Syria’s interests. For Syria, a PLO victory could welcome an Israeli intervention. Still reeling after its loss of the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War, Damascus wanted to keep Israel out of the conflict. Making matters worse, the Golan Heights are roughly twenty miles away from Syria’s capital, Damascus. An Israeli intervention would have dealt a heavy blow—both politically and strategically—to the Syrians. That said, if Syria helped the PLO, then Israel would be inclined to intervene. On the other hand, if the Christians won, then a Christian-led Lebanon would likely form an alliance with Israel, diminishing Syria’s influence in Lebanon. Damascus was also concerned that Egypt was outmaneuvering Syria to become the principal Arab power in the Middle East, especially given Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s successful peace efforts with Israel. After losing the Golan Heights and Egypt’s success negotiating with Israel, Damascus felt isolated. These factors culminated in a Syrian intervention on the side of Christian forces 1976. 

There is a strong case that Syria’s reasoning to intervene on the side of the Christians boiled down to power politics, but religious factors seemed to inform, in part, Damascus’s decision to intervene. That said, why would a Muslim state take the side of Christians fighting against Muslims? This was largely the result of Syria’s ambition to be a predominant power in the Arab world. While Syria wanted to protect its security interests by preventing an Israeli invasion in southern Lebanon, it wanted to maintain its influence over Lebanon—both to satisfy its security interests as well as limit rival Egypt’s political sway. A PLO victory would have achieved neither. A victory would have resulted in an Israeli intervention, while a loss would have ushered in a Christian-led Israeli-Lebanese alliance. Considering this, an intervention securing Syrian influence over Lebanon makes sense. It also shows how religion, in part, underpins Syria’s reasoning. 

Syria’s intentions rather than its actions show how religion played a role during its intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. Syria’s decision to intervene was informed by religious underpinnings. In the case of a Christian victory, Syria’s assumption that a Christian-led Lebanon would ally with Israel is, in part, grounded in religious assumptions. The same applies to Syria’s assumption that an intervention on the side of the PLO would trigger an Israeli intervention.

While the argument that religion caused Syria’s intervention early in the Lebanese Civil War would be fallacious, it would not be invalid to argue that it contributed to Syria’s decision to intervene. So, does religion play a role in a state’s decision to intervene in another state’s civil war? It does in part. There are several limits to the argument that third-party interventions are due to religious motives. Chief among them is that religious motives guise for state interests. This is a valid argument. However, the same could be said for state interests—they could guise for underlying religious motives. Ultimately, it depends on the specific states and cultures being examined. Going forward, scholars and analysts should pay more attention to the role religion has in civil wars, especially third-party interventions. Scenarios where Putin’s Russia intervenes in a conflict to defend Russian Orthodox Christians, or even Erdogan’s Turkey intervenes in a conflict to defend Sunni Muslims, is not far-fetched. Understanding the religious motives that underpin a state’s strategic and political interests represents an area for further research that could provide insight into the role that religion plays in civil wars.

For more on the relationship between religion and civil war, see Monica Duffy Toft, “Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31, no. 4 (2007), pp. 97-131.

References

Martha Finnemore, “Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Cornell University Press: 2003), pp. 60-62.

Faten Ghosn and Amal Koury, “Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or Illusion of Peace,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 3 (2011), pp. 1-2; Joseph Bahout, “Lebanese ‘Political Sectarianism’ in Context and Some Regional Lessons,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, September 7, 2018, pp. 1-2.

Hilde Henriksen Waage and Geir Bergersen Huse, “A Careful Minuet: The United States, Israel, Syria, and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1976,” The International History Review 42, no. 5 (2020), pp. 1087-1088.

John Nagle and Mary-Alice Clancy, “Power-sharing after Civil War: Thirty Years since Lebanon’s Taif Agreement,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 25, no. 1 (2019), pp. 3; Ghosn and Koury, “Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or Illusion of Peace,” pp. 383.